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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Commerce (Agricultural) 
 
A case study of two producer organisations in Papua New Guinea:  Lessons 
for cooperative policy and legislation 
 
  By  
Naomi Mwayawa 
 
Papua New Guinea recently revived its cooperative movement to drive rural development 
initiatives that rely on producer organisations to link small farmers to markets. The demise 
of the country’s first cooperative movement was attributed to inadequate capital and poor 
management. The New Institutional Economics theory suggests that these problems may 
only be symptoms of weak institutional and governance arrangements that characterise 
traditional cooperatives. This research examined the institutional and governance 
arrangements of two producer organisations in Papua New Guinea and analysed the impact 
of these arrangements on the achievement of their intended business strategies. The main 
purpose of this research is to inform the development of cooperative policy and legislation 
in the country. The timing of this study is opportune as the government is drafting new 
policy to guide amendments to Papua New Guinea’s 1982 Cooperative Societies Act.  
 
A qualitative, case study method was used to gather and analyse data. Two producer 
organisations established to process and market commodities produced by small farmers 
were selected as units of analysis. These organisations, a cocoa cooperative and a rubber 
company, differed in their value adding performance despite similarities in their patron 
(farmer) members and markets. Analysis followed a pattern matching approach to test 
propositions relating performance to institutional and governance arrangements.   
 
The low performing cocoa cooperative had investor unfriendly institutional arrangements 
that prevented its patron members from realising future capital gains. This not only 
discouraged investment but also encouraged members to take advantage of short-term 
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opportunities by side selling to other buyers. In contrast, the high performing rubber 
company adopted investor friendly institutional arrangements.  These arrangements were 
extended to strategic partners who contributed capital, market contracts, and expertise. 
While both organisations separated ownership from control, the cocoa cooperative was 
unable to take full advantage of centralised decision-making as it lacked competent directors 
and managers. 
 
For policy makers, it is recommended that cooperatives be allowed to issue non-
redeemable, appreciable and tradable class B shares to farmers and strategic partners, but 
with restrictions placed on voting rights (to prevent partners from gaining majority control) 
and a code of conduct to safeguard the interests of farmers.  For directors and managers, it 
is recommended that class B shares be sold to farmers as tradable delivery rights, or issued 
to farmers as tradable delivery rights ‘stapled’ to their membership shares. For donors, 
including government agencies, it is recommended that fledgling producer organisations 
should qualify for the same level of support regardless of their juristic status. 
 
Keywords: Institutional and governance arrangements, value adding performance, investor 
share cooperative, cooperative legislation, small farmers, producer organisations.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents background information on agriculture in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and the role of small farmers. This is followed by a brief description of the cooperative 
movement in PNG, reasons for this study, and an outline of the thesis. 
 
 Agriculture in PNG and the role of small farmers  
PNG is an agrarian society. Agriculture provides income for about 80% of its population 
(Hanson, Allen, Bourke, & MacCarthy, 2001) and the sector accounts for 72% of 
employment (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2012) and 17% of GDP (Allen, Bourke, & 
McGregor, 2009). The main agriculture commodities are palm oil, coffee, cocoa, copra oil, 
tea and rubber. According to statistics from the Bank of PNG (BPNG) (2015) palm oil 
accounted for 45% of the total value of agricultural exports in 2015. This is followed by 
coffee and cocoa with 21% and 14% respectively. Other crops such as copra, tea and rubber 
made up most of the remaining 20%. 
 
Small farmers produce most of these crops. They produce up to 85% of the coffee, 87% of 
the cocoa, 80% of copra oil and 35% of the palm oil (PNGDAL, 2007). These shares have 
increased in recent years (with the exception of oil palm) as production on estate 
plantations diminished in response to rising labour costs and conflict over land (Allen et al., 
2009; Australian Centre for International Agriculture Research [ACIAR], 2007; Komolong, 
Omuru, & Mbabu, 2012; Omuru & Kingwell, 2000; PNG Coffee Industry Cooperation 
[PNGCIC], 2004, 2008). This change in the structure of the agricultural sector has been 
accompanied by a decline in total production of export crops (Allen et al., 2009; Komolong 
et al., 2012). Poor performance in export crops has also been attributed to volatile 
commodity prices (Galgal & Kara, 2010; Gwaiseuk, 2001), weak physical and institutional 
infrastructure (Batt & Murray-Prior, 2011; Komolong et al., 2012), high transport, 
information and transaction costs (ACIAR, 2007; Batt & Murray-Prior, 2011), and 
inconsistency in smallholder supply and quality (Gwaiseuk, 2001; Allen et al., 2009; Batt & 
Murray-Prior, 2011). 
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While export crops are important to many smallholders, the vast majority of small farmers 
are subsistence growers that engage only with local markets if and when they produce a 
surplus (Bourke, 2001; Thompson, 1986). These subsistence households would have 
suffered a double blow when food prices increased in 2007 as they were not linked to global 
or even domestic markets and therefore did not benefit from higher product prices, yet 
confronted these higher prices as consumers of imported food staples like rice. 
Internationally, the 2007 food price crisis increased the number of food insecure people 
from 500 million to 1.2 billion (United Nations [UN], 2009). In 2008, the United Nations 
responded to the crisis with emergency relief and recommendations to improve global food 
security (United Nations High Level Task Force [UNHLTF], 2008). Foremost among these was 
a recommendation to promote producer organisations to link smallholders to markets 
(UNHLTF, 2008). 
 
Small farmers are seldom able to access high value, niche and domestic markets. This is due, 
in part, to high unit costs of transport, marketing, compliance, and transacting. They are also 
unable to finance value-adding assets and related certification schemes, and as individuals 
they lack bargaining power when negotiating contractual terms and conditions (Birthal & 
Joshi, 2007; Lyne & Martin, 2009; Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009). In 
theory, producer organisations such as marketing cooperatives help to strengthen 
bargaining power and to reduce unit costs and risk by pooling farmers’ output, and facilitate 
financing by pooling farmers’ capital (Narrod et al., 2009).  
 
Like many other developing countries, PNG is attempting to revive its cooperative 
movement (Lyne, 2012) and its latest strategies for rural development rely heavily on 
producer organisations, especially agricultural marketing cooperatives (PNG Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock [PNGDAL], 2009). Cooperatives are expected to facilitate the 
implementation of the Small and Medium Enterprise policy (Cooperative Society Unit [CSU], 
2008). This policy supports the participation of rural and indigenous communities in 
economic development. In addition, cooperatives are expected to support the Export Driven 
Economic Recovery Policy (CSU, 2008) by linking farmers to export markets.  
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However, cooperatives do not have a good track record in PNG. PNG’s first cooperative 
movement collapsed in the early 1970s (Mugambwa, 2005; CSU, 2008). In 1972, a 
committee of inquiry attributed this collapse to poor management, inadequate capital and 
weak support from the Australian Colonial Administration (Lyne, 2012). The plan to 
revitalise cooperatives involves dedicated support through subsidised capital, training, 
ongoing extension services, and audit services (CSU, 2008). Of concern is that this approach 
is very similar to the strategy pursued by the Australian Colonial Administration in the 
1960s, and is built on cooperative legislation that does not support the successful 
cooperative models that emerged in the USA, Europe and New Zealand during the 1990s 
and early 2000s (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Harris, Stefanson, & Fulton, 1996; van Bekkum & 
Bijman 2006; Woodford, 2008).  
 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature argues that the problems of inadequate 
capital and poor management encountered in traditional cooperatives are often the 
symptoms of much more fundamental problems created by their weak institutional and 
governance arrangements (Cook, 1995: Cook & Iliopoulus 1999, 2000; Royer, 1999). In view 
of the efficiency advantages that marketing cooperatives can exploit as producer-owned 
and controlled organisations (Sykuta & Cook, 2001) and the role that these organisations are 
expected to play in PNG’s development, it is crucial that PNG’s cooperative legislation be 
reviewed and amended if it precludes cooperative models that are less prone to the 
institutional problems afflicting traditional cooperatives. This research will examine the 
institutional and governance arrangements of producer organisations in PNG, and will 
analyse the impact of these arrangements on the achievement of intended business 
strategies. The purpose of the research is to inform cooperative policy and legislation in 
PNG. The timing of this study is opportune as the CSU has been mandated to draft a 
‘Cooperative Societies Development Policy’ and to amend PNG’s 1982 Cooperative Societies 
Act to align with, and support the new policy (CSU, 2008).  
 
  The cooperative movement in PNG  
PNG’s cooperative movement began in 1947 when the country was administered by 
Australia. The movement was part of Australia’s effort to encourage economic and social 
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development amongst its indigenous population (Mugambwa, 2005). Under the auspices of 
the United Nations, Australia and many other colonisers were expected to support the 
development of indigenous communities. The Australian Administration in its endeavours to 
achieve this considered cooperatives ideal for PNG, due to its self-regulating village-based 
societies. To support this, the Native Society Ordinance was enacted. This was later 
converted to the Cooperative Society Ordinance of 1965. 
 
 Interest in the cooperative movement grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. Initially the 
movement started with villagers who were organised into groups to operate trade stores. 
This later advanced into large operations involved in agricultural marketing (Singh, 1974). By 
the mid-1960s, 53% of coffee and 25% of copra production was exported through 
cooperatives (Singh, 1974). Interest in cooperatives was also evident in the increase in 
membership. Singh (1974) reported that there were a total 259 registered cooperatives with 
a membership of 74,000 individuals in 1962. This increased to 349 cooperatives and 129,000 
members in 1969 (Singh, 1974). 
 
Despite growing interest in cooperatives, there were already signs of failure by the early 
1970s. A Committee of Inquiry was mandated to investigate these failures in 1971. The 
Committee reported that 92 out of 266 primary cooperative made losses for three 
consecutive years from 1969 to 1971 and of these 53 cooperatives were in the process of 
liquidation and another 20 were out of business (Report of Committee of Inquiry into 
cooperative in PNG, 1972). It attributed the failures to poor management, inadequate 
capital and weak support from the Australian Colonial Administration (Singh, 1974; 
Mugambwa, 2005). Poor management was mainly related to misuse of funds and 
incompetence of managers and directors (Mugambwa, 2005). There was no training 
provided for the directors (Singh, 1974), who appeared to be uneducated farmers expected 
to make off-farm decisions. Managers were supposed to provide a supportive role in the 
absence of a strong leadership from the directors (Mugambwa, 2005), however, this was 
lacking. Singh (1974) also reported that there was insufficient capital for expansion and 
growth after initiating the business. Cooperatives were required to apply for loans from 
commercial banks. In addition, the Australian administration did not have clear and 
coherent policies to guide the operations of the cooperatives (Mugambwa, 2005). Signs of 
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weak policy were evident in the inadequate staffing and incompetent officers mandated to 
oversee the administration of the cooperatives. The administration disregarded the need to 
train and educate officers in cooperative management (Mugambwa, 2005). Along with this 
problem was competition from companies that provided attractive pricing which caused 
disloyalty among members of the cooperatives (Mugambwa, 2005).  
 
Although the Committee had commended the role of cooperatives in social and economic 
development and put in place strong recommendations to foster improvement, the newly 
formed government of PNG was not in favour of cooperatives. Soon after Independence the 
government withdrew support for cooperatives and shifted its focus to the Incorporated 
Land Group (ILG) to commercialise customary land (Mugambwa, Amankwah and val Hynes, 
2007). The Cooperative Ordinance of 1965 was repealed and all existing cooperatives were 
converted into companies, under the Companies Act of 1965 (Mugambwa, 2005). 
By 1980, the government reversed its decision to support the resuscitating of cooperatives. 
Its rationale was that the Cooperative Society Act allowed for a wider spectrum of 
membership and therefore provided more opportunities for economic development 
compared to ILGs (Mugambwa et al, 2007). The Cooperative Society Act was enacted in 
1982 to support this decision (Mugambwa, 2005). The 1982 Act is under scrutiny but, at the 
time of writing, remains the law governing cooperatives.  
 
Although resuscitated, cooperatives remained dormant until 2000 when the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI) recognised their role in supporting its policies. The cooperative 
concept supported two important polices, the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) policy 
and the Export Driven Recovery and Growth (EDRG) strategy (CSU, 2008). Primary 
cooperatives, in particular, were recognised as small to medium businesses and were 
anticipated to grow the local industries. In relation to the EDRG strategy, associations and 
federations of cooperatives were expected drive increases in exports of primary produce 
(CSU, 2008).  
 
The cooperative movement was revived through government funding and establishment of 
the CSU office within the MTI (Mugambwa, 2005). CSU’s primary task was to administer the 
registration of cooperatives. This also involved other supporting activities essential to 
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development and growth of the cooperatives, including the provision of subsidised capital, 
extension, training and audit services (Mugambwa, 2005; CSU, 2008). To legitimise the CSU, 
the Cooperative Society Regulation was introduced in 2003. Its purpose was to provide clear 
directions for the CSU and registered cooperatives to operate under (Mugambwa, 2005). 
Little is known about recent cooperatives’ performance in PNG. CSU Records (Table 1) show 
that there are around 6,100 primary cooperatives registered with a total of 213,000 
members and share capital totalling US$ 6.9 million (CSU, 2016). Unfortunately, there is no 
record to indicate whether these cooperatives are financially sound or even operational. 
 
Table 1. Summary of registered number of cooperatives in each region of PNG in 2016 
Province by Region  
Number of 
Cooperatives 
Number of 
Members 
Total Value of 
Shares (US$)1 
Highland Region       
Eastern Highlands  406  17,063         403,583   
Enga   169  5,417  107,224  
Hela  165  4,987  130,079  
Jiwaka  93  4,499  132,879  
Simbu  84  4,841  187,190  
Southern Highlands 1,484  31,837  1,219,797  
Western Highlands  182  8,240  308,007  
Momase  Region           
East Sepik  805  32,444  590,371  
Madang  249  9,852  531,058  
Morobe  398  15,065  1,108,176  
Sandaun  192  8,875  224,731  
Islands Region           
East New Britain  280  10,814         314,553   
West New Britain  235  15,958  371,048  
New Ireland  78  3,599  87,656  
Bougainville 95  5,144  177,409  
Southern Region  
Central 
532   
10,418 
 268,687  
Gulf 115  2 5 5  51,104  
Western 31  2,586  101,701  
Milne Bay 128  4,976  126,889  
Oro 132  8,312  238,330  
National Capital District  248  5,580  193,050  
Total 
Grand Total  
6,101 5 213,022 
213,022 
 6,872,542  
Notes: 1. 1 US$=3.3 PGK in April, 2017.  
Source: Adapted from records supplied by the Cooperative Society Unit (CSU, 2016). 
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 Purpose and justification of the thesis 
Given small farmers’ contribution to the agricultural sector of PNG and their need to access 
high value, niche and domestic markets, this research expects to put forward 
recommendations to inform the legislation and proposed policy on cooperative models that 
support value adding performance. The findings of the study are expected to benefit policy 
makers, donor agencies that promote the cooperative model, boards of directors and senior 
management of the agricultural cooperatives, and cooperative members. 
 
 Outline of the thesis 
There are six parts to this thesis. Chapter 1 highlights the importance of the study and 
provides background on the first cooperative movement in PNG. Chapter 2 reviews relevant 
literature, to explain the institutional problems that constrain traditional agricultural 
cooperatives, provides insights into the hybrid models in developed countries, and 
highlights the restrictions put in place by the legislation and policy of PNG. It concludes with 
the research questions. Chapter 3 justifies the choice of research strategy. It also explains 
the sampling, data collection and analysis techniques used in the study. Chapter 4 provides 
descriptions of each case studied. It provides a brief history of each cooperative and 
describes their business objectives, core business activities, institutional and governance 
arrangements, and value-adding endeavours. Chapter 5 draws on the case studies described 
in Chapter 4 to test propositions underpinning the theoretical model developed in Chapter 
2, and discusses the findings. The thesis concludes in Chapter 6 by answering the research 
questions and making practical recommendations aimed at improving the performance of 
agricultural marketing cooperatives in PNG, for policy-makers, directors, managers, patrons 
and shareholders. 
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Chapter 2 
 Literature review 
 
 Introduction 
This section describes the potential role of agricultural marketing cooperatives in developing 
countries, and contrasts this role with concerns about investor-unfriendly institutional and 
governance arrangements that often characterise cooperatives in these countries. The 
section ends with a review of hybrid cooperative models that have emerged in many 
developed countries, and which offer policy lessons for developing countries. 
 
 Role of agricultural marketing cooperatives in developing countries 
Two issues make it challenging for farmers in developing countries to access input and 
output markets. They are the characteristics of farmers and market imperfections (Murry-
Prior, Sengere & Batt 2009). Farmers operate on a small-scale, and they are often illiterate 
and poor in terms of cash, wealth, political and social status. Access to markets is 
constrained by inadequate physical infrastructure and unreliable public services and utilities 
that increase private transport and information costs, and raise ex ante transaction costs 
associated with the search for suitable trading partners. Inadequate legal infrastructure 
adds to ex post transaction costs as the risk of losses increases when transacting parties do 
not have access to an affordable and reliable legal system to enforce contracts (De Janvry, 
Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991). Pooling and marketing produce collectively via a cooperative 
allows small farmers to reduce high unit transaction, information, compliance, storage, 
transport and marketing costs (Markelova et al., 2009). 
 
Cooperatives can also coordinate input purchases and secure bulk discounts. Timely access 
to quality inputs is often prioritised by small farmers (Abebe, Melaku, Tegegne, A., & 
Tegegne, F., 2013; Murry-Prior et al., 2009). Cooperatives can also coordinate famers’ 
planting and harvesting schedules to better meet the needs of buyers looking for 
consistency in supply and quality (Biénabe & Sautier, 2005; King 1992). Small farmers 
experience substantial variability in yield and quality that make it difficult for them, acting 
individually, to fulfil contractual obligations with buyers. This risk can be reduced by pooling 
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produce. Cooperatives also provide a relatively inexpensive means of monitoring and 
enforcing quality standards. This is particularly important when accessing high value 
markets (Narrod et al., 2009). Farmers have more information about their peers than do 
external auditors, and are best able to screen members and monitor their compliance with 
food safety and quality standards (Narrod et al., 2008). Coffee cooperatives in PNG have a 
history of monitoring member compliance with production methods and quality standards 
required for organic certification (Murry-Prior, 2007). 
 
High value and niche markets usually require significant capital investments to finance third-
party certification schemes, cold storage, and specialised transportation (Narrod et al., 
2008; Lyne & Martin, 2009). Given appropriate institutional arrangements, cooperatives can 
encourage small farmers to pool their financial resources and finance these indivisible, 
value-adding assets (Valentinov, 2007; Alene et al., 2008; Markelova et al., 2009). Cost and 
equity sharing partnerships with private firms are also possible with appropriately 
structured cooperatives (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Lyne & Collins, 2008; Narrod et al., 2008; 
van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006). Equity capital and contractual commitments made by 
reputable trading partners often give cooperatives access to additional debt and grant 
finance.  
 
Cooperatives can also play an important role in strengthening small farmer bargaining 
power as they control much larger quantities of produce than do individual farmers, and can 
meet buyer requirements with greater predictability. Consequently, they are in a better 
position to influence terms and conditions of contracts, and can protect their members from 
unscrupulous trade practices (Birthal & Joshi, 2007).  
 
  Key principles of cooperatives  
Agricultural marketing cooperatives represent an extreme form of horizontal coordination 
in which producers (farmers) surrender decision-making power over marketing decisions in 
exchange for benefit and voting rights (Lyne & Martin, 2009). A similar situation would arise 
in a producer-owned company. The centralisation of management decisions distinguishes 
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these producer organisations from less formal group arrangements where management 
decisions are taken collectively. 
 
A producer-owned company is an example of an investor-owned firm (IOF). There are two 
key differences between a traditional cooperative and a producer-owned company. 
Although producers own both organisations, their voting and benefit rights differ. In the 
traditional cooperative, members have equal voting power and are rewarded for their 
patronage. In the producer-owned company, as in any IOF, voting and benefit rights are 
proportional to investment.  
 
The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers (Hoyt, 1996; Fairbain, 2004) founded the 
principles of modern day cooperatives. These principles are voluntary and open 
membership, democratic member control and member economic participation (Hoyt, 1996). 
Open membership has been widely interpreted by legislators as not discriminating based on 
gender, religion or political belief. It has also been interpreted as not discriminating against 
future members by charging more to join even if the cooperative has succeeded in growing 
its equity capital (Sykuta & Cook, 2001; Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Royer, 1999). For this 
reason, a traditional cooperative must redeem a member’s shares at their par value when 
the member exits the cooperative. Consequently, shares held by members of a traditional 
cooperative are not tradable or appreciable.  
 
Democratic member control implies that each member has one voting right. Member 
economic participation has generally been interpreted as restricting membership to patrons 
only. These key principles remain the foundation of traditional cooperatives. They are 
articulated by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) which defines a cooperative as 
“an independent association of persons who are united voluntarily to meet their economic 
and social and cultural needs and aspirations through mutually owned and democratically 
controlled enterprise” (ICA, 2016). 
 
It is often claimed that cooperatives enjoy a transaction cost advantage over producer-
owned companies because the interests of their members as patrons (suppliers) are 
perfectly aligned with their interests as owners. This alignment of interests eliminates 
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information asymmetries and reduces the cost of monitoring and enforcing supply contracts 
in cooperatives (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). The situation is different in a producer-owned 
company where producers with relatively large investments will seek high returns on their 
capital, while those who are relatively large patrons will seek favourable prices for the 
products and inputs they trade with the company. However, the apparent advantage of the 
cooperative breaks down in circumstances where member investment is not proportional to 
member patronage (van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006) – which is indeed the case in a traditional 
cooperative.  
 
  Institutional problems of traditional cooperatives  
Proponents of New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory argue that the principles 
underpinning traditional cooperatives result in ill-defined property rights (i.e. voting and 
benefit rights) that discourage member investment and starve the cooperative of capital 
(Cook, 1995; Cook & Iliopoulos 1999; Royer 1999). A member becomes an owner of the 
cooperative once shares are bought. In a traditional cooperative, a member’s benefit rights 
are not proportional to his or her investment in shares. This results in ‘free-rider’, ‘horizon’ 
and ‘portfolio’ problems. It also aggravates the ‘control’ problem. Voting rights are also not 
proportional to investment. This can lead to an ‘influence’ problem. 
 
An internal free-rider problem exists when there is unfairness in the distribution of benefit 
rights (Cook 1995). In the case of traditional cooperatives, where members are rewarded for 
their patronage and not for their investment, large patrons with small investment free ride 
on investments made by smaller patrons. An external free-rider problem will also arise if the 
cooperative offers its services to non-members at the same price paid to (or by) members 
(Royer, 1999).  
 
The horizon problem arises in a traditional cooperative because members cannot realise 
capital gains on their equity shares (Harris, Stefanson, & Fulton, 1996; Sykuta & Cook, 2001). 
If they leave the cooperative, their shares are redeemed at par value. This problem is more 
severe when significant investment is required for value-adding assets (including intangible 
assets like brands) that have productive lives exceeding the expected horizon of members 
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(Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Salazar & Galve Górriz, 2011). The horizon problem also shifts 
members’ preferences away from retaining earnings in the cooperative (to finance value-
adding assets) towards current benefits such as more favourable prices for outputs and 
inputs (Nilsson, 2001). The horizon problem is particularly damaging in traditional marketing 
cooperatives as it not only constrains their investment but also constrains their ability to 
build relationships with buyers; preferences for short-term benefits discourage members 
from complying with fixed price agreements when market prices rise.  
 
The portfolio problem is also related to the illiquid nature of property rights caused by the 
absence of tradable shares. Members, once invested, are unable to diversify their individual 
portfolios to reflect their own risk preferences (Ortmann & King, 2007). The consequence is 
sub-optimum investments by members.  
 
The control problem has its genesis in principal-agent theory (Ortmann & King, 2007) and 
refers to the difficult task of monitoring the performance of management and aligning their 
incentives with those of the owners. Although this problem is not unique to traditional 
cooperatives, it is intensified by the lack of a market-driven share price to signal changes in 
the expected value of the cooperative, and members’ inability to sanction (reward) 
managers by disinvesting (granting them shares) (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). Shares are 
restricted to member patrons only. 
  
Whereas the free-rider, horizon, portfolio and control problems are attributed to ill-defined 
benefit rights, the influence problem arises as a result of ill-defined voting rights (Cook, 
1995). Democratic voting rights in traditional cooperatives shift the power to influence 
investment decisions away from majority investors to majority members who may be risk 
averse and opposed to asset specific investments. Influence problems often arise in 
marketing cooperatives when divergent interests are created through the purchase of 
multiple products from cooperative members (Cook, 1995), and when members and non-
members are allowed to participate in management decisions (Rosairo, Lyne, Martin, & 
Moore, 2012). Influence problems discourage member investment and also discourage 
prospective lenders and buyers from dealing with cooperatives (Lerman & Parliament, 1993; 
Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001).  
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Together, these institutional problems limit a traditional cooperative’s ability to raise equity 
capital, and therefore limit its ability to access debt capital as lenders require acceptable 
leverage (debt to equity) ratios in order to reduce their exposure to loan default. NIE theory 
offers a plausible explanation for recent legislative changes in the USA, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and many European countries (Lyne & Collins, 2008) allowing them to relax 
the cooperative principles and to adopt hybrid cooperative models that resolve or alleviate 
the institutional problems associated with the traditional cooperative model. In particular, 
these changes have allowed cooperatives to introduce a class of shares that is non-
redeemable, tradable and appreciable while restricting majority of the voting rights to 
patrons (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006, Woodford, 2008). 
 
Several empirical studies of marketing cooperatives in developed countries have found 
evidence of the NIE’s predicted relationships between institutional arrangements and levels 
of investment (Cook & Ilopoulos, 2000; Beverland, 2007; Salazar & Galve Górriz, 2011). 
However, these cooperatives are patronised by relatively wealthy farmers. The situation is 
quite different in developing countries where farmers are poor. In these circumstances, it is 
appropriate to ask whether or not institutional problems are relevant to cooperative success 
as small farmers do not have much capital to contribute even if the incentive to invest is 
strong. Indeed, small farmer marketing cooperatives invariably source the bulk of their 
initial equity capital from donors or government agencies, and access to grant funding is 
often quoted as the main reason for registering a cooperative (Chirwa et al., 2005). 
Garnevska, Joseph, and Kingi (2014) present evidence of this in PNG. In addition, capital 
requirements are usually modest as these cooperatives often deal with commodities that 
require little value adding other than drying, grading, storage and transport. Consequently, 
it seems unlikely that institutional problems would show up as binding constraints. 
 
Nevertheless, evidence from recent empirical studies of producer marketing organisations 
in developing countries is consistent with the NIE predictions (Chibanda, Ortmann, & Lyne, 
2009; Nganwa, Lyne, & Ferrer, 2010; Rosairo et al., 2012, Esnard, 2016). Over time, 
organisations burdened with the horizon problem struggled to repair, maintain and extend 
grant-financed assets, as they were unable to retain profits owing to member preferences 
for short-term price advantages in the absence of capital gains. This raises important 
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questions about prevailing cooperative legislation and knowledge of hybrid cooperative 
models within the agencies that facilitate the establishment of cooperatives. No empirical 
work has been conducted in PNG to identify de facto institutional arrangements within 
producer cooperatives, their impact on investment in value-adding assets, or their 
consistency with current cooperative law and proposed cooperative policy. 
 
 Governance arrangements  
The Committee of Inquiry commissioned to report on PNG’s cooperatives in 1971 identified 
both inadequate capital and poor management as primary contributors to their failure. The 
previous section argued that ongoing capital constraints are often a symptom of the horizon 
problem that arises due to ill-defined benefit rights. Similarly, poor management is often a 
symptom of weak governance arrangements (Rosairo et al., 2012). 
 
Governance is defined as the decision-making processes and its capacity to implement its 
decisions (Landell-Mills & Serageldin, 1992 as cited in Chibanda et al., 2009). The 
governance system of cooperatives is made up of members, their board of directors (BoD) 
and management (Cornforth, 2004). The members are an important part of the governance 
system by virtue of their democratic voting rights (Cornforth, 2004). They hold the 
cooperative’s directors accountable for their policy decisions by voting them on or off the 
board at annual general meetings (AGMs). The BoD represents the interests of the 
cooperative’s members and is responsible for the cooperative’s strategic direction. Senior 
managers appointed by the directors are responsible for the operational planning and 
implementation of the board’s business strategy. They report to the board, and are 
ultimately held accountable by the board’s power to remove them from office.  
 
Good governance is defined by three elements. These elements are accountability, 
transparency, and participation (Nanda, 2006). Accountability is ultimately assured by well-
defined voting rights and sound electoral procedures, and by the board’s ability to hire and 
fire managers (Rosairo et al., 2012). Transparency is achieved through sincere disclosure of 
financial statements, circulation of resolutions taken at meetings, and review of budgets 
and audits (Nanda, 2006). Participation emphasises consultation with members, but not 
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their direct involvement in decision-making. This separation of ownership and control can 
alleviate influence problems even where voting rights are democratic rather than 
proportional to member investment (Rosairo et al., 2012). Management problems are likely 
to arise where these features of good governance are absent or lacking. In cooperatives, 
management problems are often exacerbated by their patron control feature as small 
farmers often lack the off-farm knowledge and skills required to perform well as directors 
(Cook, 1994), or even to appoint competent and experienced managers (Adrian & Green, 
2001).  
 
Flawed electoral procedures such as voting by show of hands instead of secret ballot tend to 
favour influential or popular nominees, rather than those with integrity and business 
acumen. Empirical studies of producer organisations in developing countries report 
evidence of positive relationships between good governance arrangements and 
performance. Chibanda, et al. (2010) found positive correlation between voting by show of 
hands and low levels of education amongst directors, and a negative correlation between 
these variables and returns to members. Rosairo, et al. (2012) attribute the failure of 
producer-owned companies in Sri Lanka primarily to the appointment of government 
officials as directors. These directors were not nominated or elected by members, nor could 
they be removed by the board - yet they were mandated to influence board and 
management decisions. Similarly, Esnard’s (2016) study in St Lucia found that cooperative 
performance suffered when externally appointed directors outnumbered those nominated 
and elected by members.  
 
PNG’s rural communities are governed by a mix of official and customary rules, and there is 
evidence of customs influencing governance arrangements in producer organisations. Lyne 
(2012) describes the role of the ‘haus boi’ in a West New Britain cocoa cooperative. The 
‘haus boi’ is a culturally recognised, male-dominated, decision-making authority. Under this 
system of governance, members have no voting rights at all. The influence of customary 
institutions on the performance of PNG’s cooperatives has not been examined. However, a 
recent study by Garnevska et al., (2014) in the Manus province revealed that only one of 
four cooperatives studied had a board of directors. Management was assigned to a 
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committee but it was not clear how, or even if, members were nominated and elected. The 
authors reported serious conflicts in one of these cases.  
 
Other governance issues considered by Chibanda et al. (2009) and Rosairo et al. (2012) 
include the regularity of financial audits and annual general meetings (AGMs), adherence to 
notice periods and quorum requirements, circulation of audit reports and minutes of 
meetings, and training for managers and office bearers. There is clearly a need to establish 
the nature of governance arrangements in PNG’s cooperatives, and how they relate to legal 
requirements and cooperative’s strategy. 
 
 Hybrid cooperatives and business strategy 
Increasing demands for safe, high quality and differentiated food products have not only 
highlighted the inability of traditional marketing cooperatives to finance value-adding assets 
and to build long-term relationships with buyers, but also resulted in new cooperative 
models that alleviate the institutional problems of traditional cooperatives. Chaddad and 
Cook (2004) define a number of hybrid cooperative models that adopt, to varying degrees, 
the institutional arrangements of investor-owned firms. One of the most well know hybrids 
is the New Generation Cooperative (NGC), which was credited with the revival of the USA’s 
Midwest in the 1990s (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; Harris, Stefanson, & Fulton, 1996). In 
developed countries, the emergence of these hybrid models was often facilitated by 
changes made to cooperative legislation. New Zealand took the lead in this regard 
introducing a single Act for cooperatives and companies in 1996 (Lyne & Collins, 2008). 
The variant closest to the traditional cooperative model is the proportional investment 
cooperative or PIC. The PIC obliges members to invest in proportion to their patronage 
(Royer, 1999). This generates equity capital and aligns the interests of members as investors 
and patrons, reducing transaction costs in supply contracts. However, the horizon problem 
remains and discourages members from voluntarily investing more than the minimum 
amount required to sustain their patronage. In circumstances where members are poor, the 
PIC offers little advantage over a traditional cooperative and is best suited to a business 
strategy focussed simply on coordinating production and negotiating better terms for its 
members in market transactions. 
 
  
17 
  
 
Members would be more willing to invest and retain profits in their cooperative if they 
could realise capital gains on their investment. In this case, there would also be less 
incentive to behave opportunistically when market prices offer short-term gains over prices 
agreed with trading partners. Member-investor cooperatives or MICs seek to alleviate the 
horizon problem by rewarding members for their investment. This is often achieved by 
adjusting the nominal price of members’ redeemable shares to reflect changes in the MIC’s 
equity capital, or by awarding bonus shares (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). While such 
institutional innovations are seldom prevented by cooperative legislation, they do not fully 
address the horizon problem, as they do not generate market-related capital gains. 
Moreover, the gains are likely to be conservative as these methods of rewarding investors 
expose the cooperative to increased redemption risk (Lyne & Collins, 2008). MIC’s also 
sacrifice the PIC’s advantage of low transaction costs as investment is not proportional to 
patronage. 
 
PNG’s Cooperative Societies Act 1982 (CSA, 1982) does provide for the issue of bonus shares 
(Section 95(b)), but shares are redeemed at the lesser of their nominal or net asset value 
(Section 62). In essence, this legislation prevents members from realising capital gains on 
redeemable shares, and therefore precludes MICs. It also precludes PICs as shares may be 
redeemed only on liquidation of the cooperative (Section 58) or when a member dies 
(Section 62).  
 
In New Zealand, cooperatives are permitted to introduce a second class of shares that are 
non-redeemable, tradable and appreciable. This addresses the horizon and portfolio 
problems as investors can realise capital gains by selling these ‘B-class’ shares at market 
prices. Ownership of B-class shares is not necessarily restricted to members of the 
cooperative.  Investor-share cooperatives (ISCs) often sell B-class shares to strategic 
partners, and some ISCs list these shares on a stock exchange to be purchased by members 
of the public. However, these shares carry no, or limited, voting rights to prevent control 
shifting from patrons to external investors. In New Zealand, external investors may not 
exercise more than 40% of a cooperative’s voting rights even if they are majority investors 
(Woodford 2008).  
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ISCs have the potential to add significant value to patrons’ products as they create 
incentives for investment and can offer shares to both patrons and non-patrons. They can 
also establish equity-sharing joint ventures with trading partners to overcome hold-up 
problems that would otherwise discourage investment in value-adding assets that are 
transaction specific (Williamson, 1985, pp. 85-102). These benefits do, however, come at 
the expense of higher transaction costs in supply contracts owing to the misalignment of 
patron and investor interests. In developing countries, small farmers looking to access high 
value markets by differentiating their product would no doubt view this as a small price to 
pay for the opportunity of establishing equity-sharing partnerships with processors and 
exporters that provide capital, expertise and intangible assets like brands, reputation, and 
contracts with downstream buyers. Unfortunately, PNG’s Cooperative Societies Act 1982 
makes no provision for the issue of non-redeemable shares and therefore precludes ISCs. 
 
One way of overcoming legal constraints that prevent cooperatives from developing equity-
sharing joint ventures with strategic partners is to establish a subsidiary company co-owned 
by the cooperative and the strategic partner. Value-adding assets are financed and owned 
by the subsidiary company. However, this ‘solution’, often referred to as the ‘Irish Model’ 
(Chaddad & Cook, 2004), does not address institutional problems within the parent 
cooperative. This makes it difficult for the cooperative to match the equity capital invested 
by its strategic partner over time, and control of the subsidiary company inevitably transfers 
to the partner leaving producers no better off. Lyne and Collins (2008) argue that a unitised 
trust would better serve as a warehouse for members’ interests in a subsidiary company as 
tradable participatory units assigning benefit and voting rights proportional to individual 
investments in the trust could be matched directly to shares acquired by the trust in the 
subsidiary. 
 
Another pathway to a value-adding business strategy, in particular a ‘focus strategy’ where 
the cooperative aims to exploit small niche markets (Porter, 1985; Nilsson & Ohlsson, 2007), 
is to establish a New Generation Cooperative. NGCs raise capital by selling tradeable 
delivery rights to patrons. In effect, these rights represent a second class of shares that are 
non-redeemable and appreciable as they can be traded by patrons at market value. This not 
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only resolves the horizon problem, but also aligns the interests of members as patrons and 
investors. These outcomes create strong incentives for patrons to honour their supply 
commitments. NGCs that purchase a single product from their patrons have proved very 
successful at adding value and building enduring relationships with buyers. In some cases, 
existing cooperatives, like the Tatua dairy cooperative in New Zealand, have issued tradable 
delivery rights free of charge to patrons simply to gain more control over supply and 
safeguard their niche markets (Nilsson & Ohlsson, 2007). 
 
Although PNG’s Cooperative Societies Act 1982 does not provide for the issue of non-
redeemable shares, it is possible that legislators may condone the sale of non-redeemable, 
tradable and appreciable delivery rights, especially if they improve the performance of 
cooperatives. While it would be optimistic to think that cooperatives patronised by small 
farmers could raise significant amounts of capital by selling tradable delivery rights, NGCs 
create strong incentives for investment and compliance, and could be good candidates for 
grant funding where equity-sharing arrangements with strategic partners are unlikely or 
impossible. Whether or not PNG’s proposed cooperative policy and legislation will embrace 
the NGC and other hybrid structures needed to support business strategies that involve 
more than just coordinating production and negotiating favourable terms for commodities 
for undifferentiated products is a question that this research will endeavour to answer.  
 
 Research objectives and questions 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of PNG’s cooperative legislation on the 
ability of agricultural marketing cooperatives to achieve their intended business strategies. 
In relation to this purpose, the objectives of this study are to; 
1. Examine the institutional and governance arrangements of producer organisations in 
PNG and assess how these arrangements affect value adding goals and performance 
of these organisations. 
2. Investigate the consistency of the institutional and governance arrangement of 
existing producer organisations with the cooperative legislation and policy of PNG. 
3. Recommend improvements to legislation and policy by drawing on theory, lessons 
from other countries, and case studies of producer organisations within PNG. 
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There are five research questions that will guide this study and ensure the objectives stated 
above are achieved. These questions are derived from the literature in Sections 3.3-3.5. 
These questions can be stated more explicitly as follows: 
 
1. Do producer organisations apply different institutional and governance 
arrangements to support business strategies that require different levels of value-
adding?   
2. Are the institutional and governance arrangements applied by producer 
organisations affecting the achievement of their intended business strategies?  
3. How consistent are these institutional and governance arrangements with PNG’s 
existing cooperative law? 
4. Would changes to PNG’s cooperative policy and legislation make it easier for 
cooperatives to achieve their intended business strategies?  
5. What other factors contribute to the achievement of intended business strategies? 
 
Two case studies were used to address the research questions. The first case was a producer 
organisation that adds little value to products destined for commodity markets by providing 
primary processing and transport services. The second case was an organisation that also 
deals with commodity markets but provides a higher level of processing of products. 
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Chapter 3  
Research methods 
 
 Introduction 
This section describes the methods used to collect and analyse data. Section 3.2 outlines a 
conceptual model that underpins these methods. Section 3.3 justifies the use of the case 
study research strategy and details how the cases were selected. Section 3.4 describes how 
data collection was done and the final section explains how data was analysed.  
 
  Conceptual model  
The conceptual model illustrated in Figure 1 summarises the propositions discussed in 
Section 2. Flexibility (or weak enforcement) of cooperative law permits variation in the 
institutional and governance arrangements of cooperatives. This flexibility allows 
cooperatives to adopt hybrid structures that create incentives to invest, retain earnings and 
comply with the terms of downstream contracts. The institutional and governance 
arrangements that define business structure are expected to impact on the achievement of 
planned business strategies, along with other (external) factors. 
 
This research investigated the hypothesis that producer organisations with weak 
institutional and governance arrangements were unlikely to achieve their value-adding 
goals. In particular, it set out to test the following propositions: 
 
a) Producer organisations that issue a class of non-redeemable, tradable and appreciable 
shares or delivery rights are more likely to sustain value-adding goals.  
 
b) Producer organisations that issue only redeemable shares are unlikely to sustain value-
adding goals if they do not revalue these shares or issue bonus shares.   
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c) Producer organisations are more likely to sustain relationships with downstream buyers if 
they issue tradable delivery rights or otherwise allow members to realise capital gains 
proportional to both investment and patronage.   
 
d)  Producer organisations that separate ownership from control by centralising decision 
making in the hands of competent directors and managers are more likely to achieve their 
value-adding goals. 
 
e) Producer organisations are more likely to sustain value-adding goals if members 
nominate elected directors, if elected directors outnumber other directors, if voting is by 
secret ballot, if directors have the authority to hire and fire executive managers, and if the 
organisation specialises in a single product.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model illustrating the impact of a cooperative’s institutional and 
governance arrangements on the achievement of its intended strategy 
  
Flexibility in institutional and 
governance arrangements 
Other factors 
Observed strategy Intended strategy Strategy gap 
Cooperative legislation 
Incentives to invest, retain earnings, and comply 
with relational contracts 
 
Strategic level 
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 Research strategy  
This study draws on the strength of qualitative research that is it enables a phenomenon to 
be studied in a holistic manner and in its natural setting (Jacob, 1988; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
Moreover, it provides a rich in depth understanding of the complex relationships that shape 
the phenomenon (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this instance, the research questions deals 
with the relationship between value adding strategies of producer organisation and its 
institutional and governance arrangements. Specifically, how the institutional and 
governance arrangements are tailored to support the intended strategy of the organisation.  
 
A case study method was chosen for this study over other qualitative methods. The case 
study method is a recognised research approach in the growing field of organisational 
research, particularly to study organisational behaviour and processes (Hartley, 2004).  This 
study draws on the strength of qualitative research that is its ability to produce a wealth of 
detailed data from entities that have small populations (Bergman, 2008 pp 12-14: Patton, 
1990 pp 165). Meyer (2001) argues that the case study method is open to use in theory and 
conceptual categories that guide the research and the analysis.  The case study method is 
unlike other qualitative methods such as grounded and ethnography theoretical 
perspective, where the theory emerges from data collected. This study was guided by the 
NIE theory detailed in the literature review and propositions stated in Section 3.2. 
Moreover, this methodology provides a richness of data as it is collected from multiple 
sources. Yin (2009, p.8-15) recommends the case study methodology when a particular 
study focuses on contemporary events over which the researcher has little or no control, 
and seeks answers for ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions.  It suggests that this approach is suited for 
explanatory enquiries. The research carried out seeks to provide explanations for the 
performance of producer organisations based on their institutional and governance 
arrangements and other factors as well. 
 
 Case study design 
Case study methods have no specific requirements guiding research design, unlike other 
qualitative and quantitative research methods (Meyer, 2001). Although Yin (1989: 2009) and 
Eisenhart (1989) provide useful insights into the strategy, they leave the design decisions to 
 
  
24 
  
the researcher. These design choices involve identifying the unit of analysis, selection of 
cases, the number of cases, and selection and choice of data collection procedures. 
For this research the units of analysis were identified as ‘producer organisations’.  Yin (2009 
p. 29-32) recommends that a case be correctly identified by accurately specifying the 
research question.  Vague research questions increase the chance of identifying incorrect 
units of analysis. Based on the first research question, which seeks to explain variation in 
value-adding performance by examining variation in institutional arrangements, the unit of 
analysis was not limited only to cooperatives but covered all agricultural marketing 
organisations owned and patronised by small-scale farmers. 
In terms of selection criteria of cases, the cases in this study were purposefully selected to 
ensure variation in their institutional and governance ‘explanatory’ variables and to control 
for other factors likely to influence performance. To this end, efforts were made to select 
organisations within the same geographical location, purchasing agricultural commodities 
that are mostly exported, and benefiting from similar levels of external support. Within this 
subset of candidate organisations, the final selection was based on the organisation’s 
accessibility and its willingness and ability to provide rich information. Preference was given 
to organisations that had been operating for more than three years.  
Deciding on the number of cases and sampling strategy are fundamental to increasing the 
reliability and validity of the data collected (Yin,). Case studies are often criticised for their 
limitations in generalising findings to the population studied.  Eisenhardt (1989) and Hartley 
(2004) argue that the sampling logic for case studies generate information that is 
extrapolated to theory and not to the population studied. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that 
cases selected should be purposely selected to replicate or extend the theory studied or to 
fill in theoretical categories and provide polar examples.  
This study used multiple case studies instead of a single case study.  Hartley (2004) 
recommends a single case study as an option where access difficulties, resources or the 
rarity of the phenomenon precludes a wider study. In contrast, selection of multiples cases 
can facilitate a comparative analysis. For this study two cases were purposely selected 
based on the criteria mentioned earlier. These two cases represented polar cases in the 
phenomena under investigation.  
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 Data collection method 
An advantage of using the case study is the multiple sources of data. Case studies typically 
combine collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations 
(Yin, 2009 pp 101-124). The choice of data collection in this study was constrained by time, 
financial resources and access. Three data collection methods chosen were interviews, 
archives and observations.  
 
For the interviews, a semi-structured interview was employed to allow respondents to talk 
freely and share their knowledge and experiences without pre-existing expectations from 
the researcher. This enabled probing of responses which may not be possible to do in a 
highly structured questionnaire (Patton, 1990). In this study, an interview schedule was used 
to guide the interview (Appendix 3). The interview schedule was based on the propositions 
and conceptual model presented in Section 3.2. A snowballing method was used to select 
respondents. This enabled the researcher to purposefully select respondents who could 
provide insights and useful information. The respondents included; directors, managers, 
shareholders, stakeholders from the Department of Agriculture and Livestock and relevant 
industry boards. The number of respondents in each producer organisation and stakeholder 
was determined by the ability to achieve saturation of the information. Interviews were 
audio recorded to ensure accuracy in the data collection process. These recordings were 
later transcribed to facilitate data analysis.   
 
In addition to the interviews, documents were collected and observations made. The 
collection of documents included founding constitutions, annual reports, audited financial 
statements, unpublished reports, records, memo and letters. These documents provided 
useful information about issues not captured in the interviews. Observations were made 
whilst visiting the processing facilities. These observations were recorded as notes and 
photographs. 
 
Participants’ confidentiality and consent was given priority for ethical reasons. Prior to 
interview, respondents were informed of the purpose of study and asked to sign a consent 
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form (Appendix 2) in order to participate. Interviews were recorded once permission was 
received from respondent. All data were kept by the researcher at a secure location. 
 
An important practical issue in the fieldwork was the selection of cases. To select suitable 
cases required knowledge on the population of functional producer organisations. Prior to 
fieldwork a list of producer organisations was drafted up based on personal contacts, CSU 
records and internet searches. Some of these organisations were short-listed and prioritised 
using the selection criteria mentioned earlier. In each case, the chairperson was contacted 
and invited to participate in the study. Final selection was based on willingness to 
participate, ability to provide rich information, and physical accessibility. The consent form 
(Appendix 2) and a research information sheet (Appendix 1) were then sent to the 
respective chairs ahead of the field visits. 
 
 Data analysis 
Data was analysed based on '“pattern matching and explanation building” as recommended 
by Yin (2009, pp. 136-143). Trochim (1989) describes a pattern as an arrangement of object 
and entities and defines pattern matching as process of linking two patterns, theoretical 
patterns and observed patterns from empirical data. In this study, the NIE theory expressed 
as propositions (listed in section 3.2) were matched with patterns observed from the two 
cases.  Pattern matching involves pattern identification within each case and then across 
cases. Eisenhardt (1989) points out that within case analysis requires descriptive write-up of 
each case, the purpose is to generate insights and be familiar with each case. This process 
allows patterns in each case to emerge. While, cross case analysis can be done in a variety of 
ways. The first method is based on categories or dimensions as basis for comparison. These 
categories are derived from theory and propositions under investigation.  The second is the 
pairing method, two cases are selected at one time and the similarities and difference 
between each is pointed out. The third method is based on data sources. Patterns in each 
data source is compared against each other on a case by case basis. This builds the validity 
of the data.  
In terms of explanation building, the aim is to analyse data by building an explanation about 
the cases. According to Yin (2009, pp. 136-143) this involves building a set of casual links 
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about how and why a something happened. This is applicable where data does not support 
the propositions. The inconsistency can be explained through the building of an alternative 
theory.  
In this study, the identification of patterns within case study was derived from data 
transcribed from interview combined with data from archives and observations for each 
case. This is presented as case description write-ups in chapter 4.  The case description 
write-ups encompasses the key features of the industry and establishment, objectives, core 
activities and the institutional and governance attributes of each case.  
After analysing the patterns within each case, comparisons were made across the cases and 
the results were used to test the validity of the propositions (listed in Section 3.2). This was 
done by identifying dimensions for comparison, this study used institutional and governance 
attributes. Attributes of traditional cooperatives based on the NIE theory was compared 
with data from each case. The result of the pattern matching exercise was presented in 
tabular form (table 2 in section 5.2). 
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Chapter 4  
Case descriptions 
 
 Introduction  
This chapter presents descriptions of the two producer organisations engaged in this study. 
It begins with a brief on the selection of cases. It goes on to describe each case, firstly by 
providing a background of their respective industries, then investigates their business 
objectives, core business activities, institutional and governance arrangements, and value-
adding activities. A summary of each case is provided as a way to conclude each case 
description. 
 
 Selection of cases 
Fieldwork was conducted from the end of November 2016 to February 2017. This began 
with a selection process of producer organisations most suitable for the study. The 
researcher initially attempted to select producer organisations within a single commodity 
industry, which was the cocoa industry. According CSU records there was a large number of 
cooperatives registered with cocoa marketing cooperatives. In addition to the cooperatives, 
there was a producer company involved in cocoa marketing. However, after a visit to the 
CSU office and consultations with the stakeholders of the cocoa industry, the researcher 
learnt that many of these cooperatives, including the producer company, were no longer 
operational. From consultation with stakeholders, the researcher was able to identify and 
confirm participation of one cooperative which was operational, accessible and willing to 
participate in the study.   
 
As a result of the non-operational status of the cooperatives in the cocoa industry, other 
export commodities were sought as an alternative. Producer organisations in the coffee 
industry provided a suitable option. A Fairtrade coffee cooperative with a subsidiary 
company was selected, however, upon consultation with the chairperson it was apparent 
the key respondents were unwilling to participate. Safety and accessibility issues hindered 
the researcher from selecting other producer companies and cooperatives in the coffee 
industry located in the highlands of PNG. Instead, a rubber company co-owned by small 
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rubber farmers was chosen. The researcher identified this company through an internet 
search and later consulted stakeholders to verify its operational status.  The company’s chair 
welcomed the invitation to participate in the study and was willing to provide a rich source 
of information. Also, a group of flower growers were willing to participate, however, their 
product would be classified as a high value crop which did not enter the export market. This 
did not match the criteria specified in section 3.4, therefore this organisation was ruled out.   
 
The main difficulty experienced in the selection and confirmation of participation was 
communication issue. Most small farmer owned producer organisations in PNG are not 
connected to telephone or internet services due to their remote locations. Direct contact 
was not possible; the researcher was assisted by stakeholders who willingly provided 
personal contact details of chairpersons of the producer organisations.  
 
For the purpose of this study, two producer organisations representing different ownership 
structures were chosen. These cases were selected as they satisfied the criteria described in 
Section 3.4. These producer organisations were coded as CASE 1 and CASE 2. CASE 1 is a 
cocoa cooperative owned by smallholder cocoa farmers. CASE 2 is a company co-owned by 
smallholder rubber farmers and a strategic partner that processes ‘technically specified 
rubber’ (TSR) from natural rubber.  
 
 CASE 1 
CASE 1 is one of the many cooperatives established post-2000 following the government’s 
decision to revive PNG’s cooperative movement. It is a cooperative that produces and 
markets dry cocoa beans. CASE 1 operates a cocoa farm, carries out primary processing of 
cocoa beans and operates a buying station for dried and wet beans. It purchases cocoa 
beans from its members and on-sells it to a local exporter. It is a small player in the 
domestic cocoa industry. CASE 1 struggles to stay in business as it is unable to offer 
favourable prices to its members. Nevertheless, it sold 238 ton of cocoa from 2014 to 2016. 
This represented less than 1% of the total volume of cocoa export out of the country in the 
year 2016 alone.  
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CASE 1 is owned and governed by small cocoa farmers. There are 500 small farmers who are 
patron members of the Cooperative. These farmers own 1-2 hectares of cocoa farms 
(consisting of 1000-1500 trees of cocoa) within the vicinity of the Cooperative’s setup. The 
farmers are mostly settlers who have bought land off the local land owners.  Cocoa farming 
is the main source of livelihood for these farmers.   
  
To collect the information necessary for this study, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with eight respondents coded as 1A to 1H. They included three directors, three 
ordinary members of the Cooperative and two external stakeholders. These interviews were 
conducted in Pidgin, a common language in PNG. Interviews were audio recorded upon 
consent from the respondents. The interviews took a minimum of thirty minutes and a 
maximum of two hours. 
 
 Background on the cocoa industry  
Before describing CASE 1’s observed strategy and its institutional and governance 
arrangements, it is important to have an insight into the industry in which it operates. This 
will provide the context and provide a brief on the product flow and highlight the underlying 
industry structure that shapes the competitive environment for CASE 1.  
 
PNG is a small player in the world cocoa industry but this industry is a key contributor to the 
PNG economy. PNG produces only 1% of cocoa on the world market. The cocoa industry is a 
key export earner in the agriculture sector of PNG. It contributed an annual average revenue 
of US$79 million from 37,000 ton of cocoa exported in the year 2011 to 2016 (Cocoa Board 
of PNG, 2017). It made up 13% of the total export revenue received from the                                                                                                                                                           
agriculture sector from 2011 to 2016 (Bank of PNG, 2017). It trails behind palm oil, which 
contributes 53% of the total agriculture exports, and coffee which contributes 27%.  
 
The product flow of cocoa in the domestic market begins at the farm gate as a cocoa pod 
and ends with the exporters as bagged dry beans. Figure 2 details this flow of cocoa through 
different players in the industry. There are five discrete processes; harvesting of pods, 
primary processing, collection, and bulking and exporting. At the farm level the cocoa pods 
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are harvested from the cocoa trees, split and the wet cocoa beans are extracted. After 
extraction of the beans primary processing of cocoa is done. This process involves 
fermentation and drying. Fermentation is a critical process that enables the chocolate 
flavour to develop in the beans. After five days of fermentation, the beans are dried. The 
drying ensures moisture levels are reduced and enable cocoa to be stored up to a maximum 
of 9 months. After the beans are dried, sorting and packing takes place. The defective beans 
are removed and then the beans are packed into jute bags, each weighing 63.5 kilogram and 
labelled with respective fermentary numbers for traceability purposes. Once the bags are 
packed then the cocoa is ready to be marketed. This involves collection of the dried cocoa 
bags through buying centres located throughout the 14 cocoa growing provinces in PNG. At 
the buying centres, the bags of cocoa are stored to ensure sufficient quantities are reached 
for transportation to exporters. The exporters then sell the dried cocoa beans to importers 
and chocolate processors overseas.   
 
Quality inspections are done at buying centres and at the exporters’ warehouse prior to 
export. Quality checks are done through sampling and cut tests. At the buying centres, a 
sample cocoa beans are drawn from each set of bags of cocoa delivered. Though visual 
inspection defective beans are detected. The categories of defective beans are mouldy, 
slaty, insect damaged, double, broken, germinated and flat beans (Cocoa regulation, 1982, 
Section 5). The acceptable percentage of defective beans in a sample of 100 beans should 
be 1% for slaty beans and 5% for all other defective features (Cocoa regulation, 1982, 
Section 5).   
 
At production level, there is dominance by small farmers. There are about 150,000 small 
farmers who cultivate no more than five hectares of land (Curry et al, 2007). The production 
averages a yield of 300-500 kilogram of dry bean per hectare (Ngim, Gende, & Crozier, 2016; 
Curry et al, 2007). These farmers contribute 90% of the total production and the plantation 
sector accounts for the other 10% (Cocoa Board, 2016). The low production from 
plantations is attributed to an extended period of low prices, an escalation in land tenure 
disputes (Curry et al, 2007), and the high cost of production particularly labour costs 
(Omuru, 2003). 
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At the processing level, a number of small farmers operate fermentaries. There are 5,500 
small farmers with fermentaries, this approximately 4% of total households1 involved in 
cocoa farming. In addition to this, there are 2,500 cocoa bean dealers who process wet 
beans from farmers without fermentaries (Allen et al., 2009). Small farmers operate mini-
sized fermentary units containing four sweatboxes and wood-fired kiln driers specially 
designed to meet their production output and financial capacity. Large entities operate 
fermentaries with a maximum of 20 sweatboxes and dryers powered by diesel or electricity. 
The cost of a fermentary and drier depends on the size and technology used in the drying 
process.   
 
At the marketing level, two exporters dominate the market for dried beans. These exporters 
have an extensive network of cocoa buying stations throughout PNG. This is a strategy to 
gain economies of scale. These exporters account for 75% of the total market share for 
cocoa exported. The remaining 12% of the market share is distributed among 12 other 
exporters (Cocoa Board, 2017).  
 
Figure 2. Product flow of dried cocoa beans in the domestic market and players involved 
at each stage  
 
In terms of central state agencies, the Cocoa Board of PNG has the overarching 
responsibility of promoting cocoa as a sustainable industry. It regulates the industry by 
licensing traders in the industry, setting quality control standards and providing support for 
research, extension and downstream services. It also manages a cocoa stabilisation funds 
                                                          
1 This is calculated based on figures from Curry et al., (2007).  The population of small cocoa farmers is 
estimated to be 150,000. 
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for the producers. Cocoa and Coconut Institute (CCI) is the delegated research arm of the 
Board.  
 
There are opportunities for the PNG cocoa industry to exploit the market for its fine-
flavoured cocoa beans. Fine flavour cocoa is produced from genetic varieties of cocoa 
planting material derived from ‘Criollo’ and ‘Trinitario’ varieties, while bulk cocoa is 
produced from ‘Forastario varieties’. Cocoa in the world market is dominated by ‘bulk 
cocoa’ produced by the Ivory Coast and Ghana. CCI, through years of research, have 
developed hybrid varieties of fine cocoa which has been distributed to all producers 
throughout PNG. PNG contributes 9% of the world’s fine flavour cocoa (Royal Tropical 
Institute, 2013). Despite the production of fine flavour cocoa varieties, small farmers sell 
their cocoa as bulk cocoa at standard world market prices. 
 
PNG’s ability to capture premium price from it fine flavour cocoa varieties is limited by its 
ability to ensure consistency in quality and quantity of cocoa produced by numerous small 
farmers. Unlike commercial operations, small farmers rely on family labour and are price 
sensitive; production is high when the price is high and there are no incentives to produce 
when the price is low (Curry et al., 2007). PNG farmers are allowed to process their own 
cocoa to ensure maximum returns are received by farmers. This is not the case in other 
countries where cocoa primary processing is carried out by certified bean dealers only. The 
downside of this is that quality is undermined due to substandard quality control practices 
and lack of maintenance of processing facilities, particularly the driers.  
 
Furthermore, the outbreak of Cocoa Pod Borer (CPB) in 2006 and its ongoing impact has 
reduced quantity significantly, as small farmers struggle to combat the pest. Production has 
estimated to have reduced by 6% every year since the outbreak of CPB (Curry et al., 2007). 
The small farmers are unable to combat the pest on their own due to the high cost of 
chemicals and tools, coupled with limited knowledge on control methods.  
 
In response to these issues, donor and government support have been put in to assist small 
farmers restore their livelihood. One such donor funded project is the ‘Productive 
Partnership in Agriculture Project (PPAP)’ funded by the World Bank, IFAD and EU and 
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implemented by Cocoa Board. This project is worth US$ 9.3 million. It aims to improve the 
livelihood of small cocoa farmers through the improvement of the performance and the 
sustainability of the cocoa value chain (Cocoa Board, 2016). 
 
 Objectives and core business of CASE 1 
With this background, CASE 1 is set up to capture the benefits offered by the donor and 
Government in response to CPB. Its objective, as stipulated in its constitution, is to process, 
store and market its members’ produce. There was no documented business plan to provide 
details of how it intended to achieve this objective. Directors 1A and 1B, and members 1E 
and 1F, claimed that the vision of the Cooperative was to venture into export marketing, 
exploiting niche markets, but it had made little progress in this regard. In 1A’s own words:  
 
“The Cocoa Board has found a potential market in New Zealand and Australia. The 
Cooperative is not in a position to export yet. A large fermentary and dryer unit, with 
the capacity to process one tonne is needed. Samples of dried cocoa were sent but 
did not meet the buyers’ standards.” 
 
In regards to its objective of processing, the Cocoa Board had funded its processing facility. 
The Cocoa Board engaged CASE 1 to help roll out its CPB recovery programme, and 
equipped the Cooperative with a fermentary and dryer unit. Image 1 shows the fermentary 
set up. It contains four fermentary boxes built of timber sheltered under an iron roofing. 
Attached to the fermentary is the drier, shown in Image 2. This is a wood-fired kiln dryer 
with capacity to process 500 kilogram of wet cocoa beans per week.  Compared to large 
plantation operations, CASE 1’s fermentary set-up is small. On large plantations, 20 ton of 
wet beans per week can be processed using cascade style fermentary units and diesel-fired 
heated drying beds. In terms of achieving its objective of marketing, it has not yet achieved 
an export market status.  
 
Its marketing service is limited to buying wet and dry cocoa beans at its central buying 
station, located within the vicinity of its members’ farms. The wet beans bought from its 
members are processed into dried beans using this facility. Members who are able to 
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process wet beans on-farm pack their dried beans in jute bags, ensuring each bag weighs 64 
kilogram. These bags are labelled with the farmer’s fermentary licence number (issued by 
the Cocoa Board) for traceability purposes.  The farmer stores them until they have 
sufficient quantities to deliver and sell to CASE 1. Once brought into the premises of the 
Cooperative, the quality inspections are done. 
 
The reason for the establishment of a central buying station was to reduce transport costs 
for its members. The main issue for CASE 1’s members, particularly if they operate 
individually, is the high transport cost. Although not too far away from the main town, it is 
only accessible by four-wheel drive vehicles due to rough road conditions and water 
crossings. This makes transport costs higher than usual.  
1H claims in his own words: 
 
“Members receive a price benefit similar to selling in town. Transport fee is exempted.” 
 
In terms of storage, it is able to provide minimal storage space for the cocoa it receives 
compared to large commercial operations that have specifically designed buildings. CASE 1 
uses a 20-foot shipping container as its storage facility. The container is able to cater for 
100-200 bags of cocoa at one time. This container and the setup of the buying station is 
illustrated in Image 3. 
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Image 1. Fermentary setup donated by the Cocoa Board 
 
Image 2. CASE 1’s kiln cocoa drier 
 
CASE 1 owns 10 hectares of land. A large portion (90%) of this land is planted to cocoa. The 
total production of dry bean cocoa expected from this land is estimated to be six ton2 per 
                                                          
2 This estimation is based on the assumption by Omuru (2001) cited in Curry et al (2007) that dry bean 
production for a smallholder system is at 620 kilogram per hectare. 
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annum. The Cooperative’s dryer on the other hand produces 300 kilogram of dry beans (500 
kilogram of wet beans) per week. Given this yield, the dryer should be able to meet the 
processing capacity required by the farm if production is evenly distributed throughout the 
year. However, this is not the case, at peak seasons when production is expected at its 
maximum, the limited processing capacity of the drier becomes a major problem for the 
Cooperative. This also limits CASE 1’s ability to process wet beans purchased from its 
members.  
 
CASE 1 relies heavily on donor support to achieve its objectives. Apart from PNG Cocoa 
Board’s donation of the fermentary unit, the Local Level Government also gifted members 
of CASE 1 with a vehicle to help transport its cocoa. Unfortunately, this vehicle was 
repossessed by a micro-finance bank to repay defaulted payments for a loan taken out on 
the land. At the time of the study, the Cooperative was also participating in a project funded 
by the World Bank, the Productive Partnership in Agriculture Project (PPAP). This project 
gave CASE 1’s members access to training on cocoa pod borer management, tools, and to 
clone and hybrid CPB tolerant planting material through the establishment of nurseries and 
bud wood gardens. The Cooperative collaborated with a local cocoa exporter to implement 
this project. Formally registered as a cooperative in November of 2009, CASE 1 was able to 
sustain its cocoa buying station despite the damage wrought by CPB, thanks to technical, 
financial and market support provided by the government, donors and a local cocoa 
exporter. 
 
To sum up CASE 1’s ability to meet its objectives is dependent on donor funding.  It has the 
vision to export into the niche market unfortunately it is unable to ensure consistency in 
quality and quantity of cocoa produced by its farmers. Its marketing operation is limited to 
the domestic market, buying wet beans and dried beans from its members and on-selling it 
to a local exporter.  
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Image 3. CASE 1’s cocoa buying station, which includes storage facility and a small office 
 
 Value adding business strategy 
CASE 1’s vision was to export cocoa and to exploit niche markets, but the Cooperative had 
not met the quantity, quality or value-adding levels required to escape the local commodity 
market for dried cocoa beans. Value adding is limited to processing wet beans into dried 
beans. Image 4 shows these dried beans on the drying trays. Opportunities to add value 
through organic and Fairtrade certification exist, but the directors were not familiar with the 
processes or standards required for certification. They lacked information and marketing 
expertise, and relied on Cocoa Board officers to seek market opportunities. 
 
To secure cocoa for the commodity market, the Cooperative has to offer growers prices that 
will attract large volumes of cocoa in order to reduce unit processing, storage, transport and 
transaction costs, and to negotiate favourable selling prices with exporters. Considering that 
CASE 1’s fermentary and dryer were grant financed, the Cooperative should have been in a 
position to offer patrons attractive prices. But this was not the case. 
 
At the time of the study, the Cooperative collaborated with a local exporter to set up its 
buying point. As described by 1H, under this collaborative arrangement, it would buy dry 
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cocoa beans at a price set by the exporter and receive a 2% bonus on every bag supplied. 
The exporter would also provide a storage container, transport and an employee to operate 
the buying station. Directors 1A and 1B, and member 1D, confirmed that the exporter paid 
an additional US$ 93.00 for the use of the Cooperative’s premises. This is a beneficial 
arrangement for CASE 1, as it cannot meet the requirements set by the Cocoa Board to 
obtain a dry bean dealer licence. It is not able to meet a performance target of 150 ton per 
annum (it is only able to meet 80 ton per annum3 which is about half of the target quantity), 
nor does it have expertise in quality control, trading and marketing of cocoa. Moreover, it 
could not afford quality check equipment such as grinders, sorters’ trays, moisture meters 
and other cut test equipment required for quality control. These resources are provided by 
the exporter.  
 
The collaboration with the exporter is not a legally binding arrangement. According to 1A 
and 1H, the arrangement between the Cooperative and the exporter is based on verbal 
agreements. The exporter is not involved in any way in the governance and decision-making 
of the Cooperative. In addition, there are no conditions for the quality, timely delivery or 
quantity to be met.  
 
CASE 1 and its collaborating exporter can be classified as small players in the domestic 
market for cocoa. This particular exporter only operates within ENBP and is not as 
competitive as the leading exporter as it only has a 2% market share of the domestic dried 
beans. CASE 1’s operation is small and limited to domestic marketing only. Records from the 
export company shows that from 2014 to 2016, CASE 1 has supplied, 238 ton of cocoa to 
the exporter. This amounted to less than 1% of the exporter’s cocoa purchases from 2014 to 
2016. 
 
Under this arrangement, members 1D, 1E, and 1F complained that prices offered by the 
Cooperative were lower than those offered by rival exporters. 1D, a registered member, 
recalled his experience:  
                                                          
3 This is based on total production of 238 ton over a three year period from 2014 to 2016. 
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On two occasions, I sold bags of dried cocoa to a rivalry exporter. It was during a 
meeting day, the members and directors witness the exporter’s truck pull up next to 
my house, loaded my bags of cocoa and drove off…It was my way of showing, I was 
not happy with the price offered by the Cooperative. 
 
The Cooperative was paying its members the same price offered by the local exporter. 
Members were not receiving the 2% offered by the exporter. 1A claimed this 2% paid for 
labour work in the processing unit and cocoa farm.  
 
Side selling is a common problem in traditional marketing cooperatives as members have a 
preference for short-term gains when patronage is not proportional to investment and 
there are no prospects of realising market-related capital gains. In the presence of side 
selling, cooperatives struggle to build relationships with premium buyers as they cannot 
supply consistent quantities of quality product.  
  
 
Image 4. Dried cocoa beans after being heated over the dryer for three days 
 
In summary, CASE 1’s value-adding activities fell a long way short of its goals. The 
Cooperative processed wet beans into dry beans but did not offer its members competitive 
prices for their cocoa. Members had little incentive to sell their cocoa to the Cooperative as 
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prices were low and they could not realise long-term benefits through market-related 
capital gains. Side selling reduced the volume of cocoa delivered to the Cooperative. This, in 
turn, created cost inefficiencies in processing and undermined the Cooperative’s ability to 
meet the quantity, quality and consistency requirements of premium buyers in the 
commodity market.  
 
 Institutional and governance arrangements  
The Cooperative adopted conservative institutional arrangements that were unlikely to 
support a value-adding business strategy. It issued 500 membership shares, each with a 
nominal value of US$155.64. Membership was restricted to individuals who owned and 
farmed cocoa trees within in the catchment area served by the Cooperative. Patrons must 
purchase a minimum of one share to become registered members. At the time of the study, 
the Cooperative had 500 members, of whom only 13 were registered (i.e., fully paid-up) 
members. 
 
The intention was to finance unpaid shares from payments owed to patrons for their cocoa. 
However, farmers avoided these deductions by selling their cocoa to other buyers. This 
situation is likely to persist, as CASE 1’s constitution does not impose a limit on the time 
taken to pay for shares in full. Moreover, 1A and 1C noted that the board had an incentive 
to treat all patrons as full members because the Cooperative required large numbers to 
qualify for donor projects such as the PPAP. All of CASE 1’s members, both registered and 
non-registered, were small farmers.  
 
CASE 1’s intention was to raise US$ 77,981 in equity capital. However, the Cooperative 
raised only US$ 5,844 as members avoided equity payments by side selling. This equity 
capital financed cocoa purchases. Respondents 1A, 1C, and 1D confirmed that the 
Cooperative had financed its durable assets from grants provided by the government and 
donors. 
 
                                                          
4 This share value is calculated to be 18% of the average income of a smallholder cocoa farmer in a year. This is 
based on the average annual income of US$ 888.77 per annum (Omuru et al., 2001). 
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Membership shares are redeemable, non-tradable and non-appreciable. Members can 
transfer shares with the board’s permission. The Cooperative will redeem members’ shares 
at their nominal value plus ‘interest’ if they exit, but only when the Cooperative can afford 
to make the payment. 1A reported that no members had formally withdrawn from the 
Cooperative since the time of its establishment. Nevertheless, CASE 1 is exposed to 
redemption risk. 
 
Registered members are entitled to one vote regardless of the number of shares held. Non-
registered members are not entitled to vote but this rule was ignored when directors were 
nominated and elected. Members are grouped into geographic zones with each group 
nominating one director to represent its interests on the board. Since the zones are of 
unequal size, members of larger groups effectively have less representation than do 
members of smaller groups, so control of the Cooperative is not strictly democratic.  
 
The Cooperative is controlled by a board of seven directors and a manager appointed by the 
board. All of the directors are members of the Cooperative, and were nominated and 
elected by members at an annual general meeting. 1A described the process as follows: 
 
Members sat in their respective community zones, then they nominated a candidate 
from within their community zones. Members knew who were the potential leaders 
in their own communities and immediately nominated them… In many of the zones, 
the nominees were unopposed so they instantly qualified as directors. 
 
Members cast their votes by a show of hands, although the Cooperative’s constitution does 
provide for secret ballot. According to 1D: 
 
“We have not had an election lately but I remember the last time we had elections, I 
put my hands up to vote for the nominee of my choice, I did not write their name 
down on a piece of paper.” 
 
All members voted irrespective of their payment status. This contradicted the Cooperative’s 
constitution, which restricts voting rights to members who are fully paid-up. 
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Only one of the seven directors had more than a primary school level of formal education. 
All of the directors were experienced cocoa producers. Most of them had worked on cocoa 
plantations in East New Britain, and had managed their own farms for more than 20 years. 
The chair of the board had previously worked for a bank. His off-farm experience had been 
invaluable to the development of the Cooperative.  
 
Directorships have a three-year term, and directors can serve a maximum of two terms. 
However, the chairperson was in his third term. 1A stated that no one else was qualified and 
willing to take up this role. The board usually meets on a quarterly basis. 1B and 1C claimed 
that board meetings focussed mostly on donor projects rather than the Cooperative’s own 
vision and business strategy. Nevertheless, respondents were all of the opinion that external 
agencies did not influence the board even though the Cooperative relied heavily on 
government and donor funding.    
 
Appointment of competent managers and officers had been problematic. Initially, the board 
appointed a former employee of the Department of Trade and Commerce to manage the 
Cooperative. A former teacher served as the Cooperative’s secretary, and a former 
provincial administrator as its treasurer. Neither of these officers, nor the chairperson, had 
first-hand experience managing a large commercial business operation. 1A explained that 
initially the Cooperative was able to pay its officers but was no longer able to finance these 
positions. At the time of the study, the chairperson was acting as manager without 
remuneration. The secretary and treasurer positions were vacant.   
 
1D, 1E, and 1F claimed that the board did not call AGMs regularly, although members did 
meet most weeks to discuss progress with the PPAP project and to inform members of 
activities planned by the board and project partners. Image 5 captures some of the 
members after their usual PPAP project meeting. Transparency was lacking. According to 
the Cooperative’s constitution, the board must give members a fortnight’s notice of an 
AGM, along with access to the Cooperative’s financial statements. 1D, 1E, and 1F 
complained about the absence of verified financial reports. Although 1A submitted an 
annual report for 2015 to the CSU, the report did not present a formal Balance Sheet or 
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Profit and Loss Statement. This was attributed to financial difficulties experienced in 2012 
that had obliged the board to lay off the Cooperative’s secretary, treasurer and manager. 
These financial problems had also prevented the board from appointing an external auditor, 
and the CSU did not provide an auditing service. Nevertheless, CASE 1’s cashbooks were 
readily made available to the Researcher and appeared to be in good order. 
 
Members do not participate directly in strategic or operational decision-making, unless they 
involve the alienation or acquisition of significant assets. 1A claimed that members 
participated in a decision to pledge the Cooperative’s truck as collateral for a loan taken to 
finance land. The bank repossessed and sold the truck when the Cooperative defaulted on 
its loan repayments in 2011.   
 
Image 5. Members of CASE 1 gathered for their weekly meeting 
 
In summary, it is evident that many of the Cooperative’s patrons did not invest in the 
Cooperative, investment is not proportional to patronage, and there is no system of 
tradeable delivery rights. Members’ prospects of realising capital gains are slim and certainly 
not market-related. Control of the Cooperative is not strictly democratic. Members and 
external stakeholders do not participate in decision-making, but the Cooperative is closely 
engaged in donor and government supported projects. Directors lack off-farm business skills 
and the Cooperative cannot afford to hire a manager, treasurer or secretary.   
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 CASE 2  
CASE 2 operates a natural rubber processing plant, which produces TSR, a dry natural rubber 
product processed to meet a specific technical standard. At the time of the study, the 
owners were small rubber farmers and a rubber trading company. The Company began as a 
joint venture between the rubber trading company and a trust funded by a mining company 
in 1993. Over the years, it has adopted a hybrid cooperative type structure but is still 
registered as a company. It is the second largest rubber processing operation in PNG. It 
produced 19% of the total processed rubber exported from 2013 to 20155.   
 
CASE 2 has 3,757 patron members.  These members own 400 to 1,500 trees of rubber and 
have the capacity to produce an average of 5,600 kilogram of raw rubber per annum. These 
farmers are located in 104 villages in the Western province of PNG, mostly in mining 
affected areas and in the remote areas along largest river in PNG. Apart from royalty 
payments for those in the mining affected areas, rubber farming remains the main source of 
livelihood.  
 
Ten respondents were interviewed. These respondents are coded in the case descriptions as 
2A to 2J. The respondents included five directors, two representing the rubber trading 
company and three representing the small farmers, three patron members, one manager 
and one stakeholder. The interviews were conducted in English and the common local 
language, Pidgin. These interviews were audio recorded with consent of the respondents.  
 
 Background and history of the rubber industry  
Rubber is a small industry compared to cocoa. According to the Bank of PNG (2016), rubber 
contributed an average of US$ 6 million per annum to the economy of PNG for 2010 to 
2016, whereas cocoa, contributed US$ 79 million per annum, which is ten times as much as 
the rubber industry. 
 
                                                          
5 This is calculated from 8,800 ton of rubber exported of PNG from 2013 to 2015 (Bank of PNG, 2017). 
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There has been a significant decline in the rubber industry. In the 1950’s the industry 
contributed 12% of the total agricultural export returns (Allen et al., 2009). This has dropped 
to 1% since the 1980’s and has continued to remain like this since then (Allen et al., 2009). 
The decline was attributed mainly to the decrease in the planation sector and the inability of 
small farmers to sustain production. The reasons for the decrease in the plantation sector 
are similar to those of the cocoa industry; mainly the high cost of labour, land disputes, and 
compulsory government land acquisition (Allen at al., 2009). PNG’s Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock reports that in 2012, there were 18,000 hectares of land planted 
to rubber but only 30% was in production. This low rate was due to low rubber prices 
coupled with poor accessibility, poor transport, and lack of access to marketing services 
(Bunger & Smit, 1997).  
 
The product flow of rubber in the domestic setting begins at the farm gate as rubber latex, 
and ends at exporter premises as processed dry rubber. Figure 3 outlines this product flow. 
First, on a rubber farm, the latex from the rubber tree is harvested by tapping the tree. This 
is done by making an incision in the bark of the rubber tree. The latex is then collected in 
cups and left to naturally coagulate. For the farmer, the process ends when the rubber is 
naturally coagulated. This differs from ribbed smoke rubber where the latex is coagulated 
under controlled conditions and then pressed through rollers to create sheets that are 
smoked dried. Second, the farmer collects the coagulated rubber and stores it ready for sale 
to a trader or directly to a processor. The traders are responsible for collection, storage and 
transportation to the nearest processing plant. Once the rubber arrives at the processing 
plant it is cut up and blended. Then it passes through three levels of grinding and washing. 
The clean rubber is extruded into a noodle-like mass, which is dried by hot air and finally 
compressed into slabs of dried rubber ready for export. Image 8 shows an example of 
rubber after that has been grinded, washed and extruded into the noodle-like mass at CASE 
2’s processing plant. Before an export certificate is issued, rubber samples are sent to 
approved testing laboratories outside of the province. If the standards have been attained 
the rubber is wrapped and packed into palletised bales ready for export.  
 
At the production level, a characteristic of the industry is that there is an equal supply of 
raw rubber produced by plantations and small farmers. According to Allen, Bourke and 
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McGregor (2009) there are 6,700 small farmers who cultivate 8,400 hectares of rubber. 
Three large plantations and other small plantations cultivate another 8,300 hectares of land. 
The largest plantation is run by a foreign owned company and contributes 32% of the total 
production (Allen at al., 2009). For small farmers, 71% of the total production comes from 
the Western and Central province with 25% and 46% each respectively. These are the only 
provinces with operational processing plants. 
 
In terms of domestic trading, processing and exporting, two companies dominate. A foreign 
owned company located in the Central Province and CASE 2 located in Western Province. 
These two companies successfully operate processing plants at full capacity. In addition, 
they have integrated the role of producers and rubber buyers (Allen et al., 2009). The 
foreign owned company produced 85% of the total rubber exported in 2006 and buys raw 
rubber extensively in PNG (Allen et al., 2009). In total, there are four factories producing TSR 
in PNG, however, two factories owned by the government were operated below capacity 
due to the low supply of rubber (PNGDAL, 2007). In terms of rubber trading, there are also 
rubber traders who export natural rubber without processing. The Department of 
Agriculture and Livestock do not permit the exportation of raw rubber but there are no laws 
in place to stop this from happening. 
 
In comparison to the cocoa industry, the processing cost of rubber is higher than that of 
cocoa. Processing for cocoa requires fermentary and drier units, which come at a reasonable 
cost.  While in the case of rubber, processing requires significant investment in processing 
plants. The cost of establishing a small processing plant like that of CASE 2 was less than 
US$100,000. Without processing small farmers receive a small fraction of the total export 
price. Prices received by small farmers can drop as low as US$ 0.13 per kilogram for dry 
rubber content equivalent (Pacific Islands Report 2010: Bunger & Smit, 1997).  This is not 
much when compared to the export price for natural rubber which ranged from US$ 0.50 to 
US$ 1.20 per kilogram from 1995 to 2005 (PNG Institute of National Affairs [PNGINA], 2006).  
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Figure 3. The product flow of rubber in the PNG rubber industry 
 
Western Province is the only province in PNG that has expanded its rubber cultivation while 
other provinces have seen a decline in the cultivation of rubber and replacement with other 
crops. CASE 2 is located in this province. According to CASE 2’s records of the rubber 
developments in the province, in 1993 when the Company started, the province had only 
1,900 hectares of rubber and 2, 400 growers. In 2016, this increased to 8,900 hectares and 
11, 400 growers. These developments were funded by various organisations over a period 
of time. They included the mining company through its Trust in charge of community 
development, the provincial government, CASE 2 and another non-profit organisation, 
which held 52% of the shares in the mining company.  Respondent 2J, confirmed the mining 
company played a major role in funding development projects around the mining areas 
including CASE 2’s establishment. These initiatives are part of its Community Mine 
Continuation Agreement with all communities affected by the mining. Under this 
agreement, it is expected to pay compensation, investment and development payments to 
the 158 communities within its vicinity. This agreement was essential to the granting of its 
social licence to operate in PNG. 
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Image 6. Noodle-like masses of rubber after being processed through an extruder at CASE 
2’s processing plant 
 
To sum up, rubber industry is a small industry made up of small farmers, plantations and 
two larger companies which dominate the processing companies. Western Province is the 
only province in PNG that has seen increase in rubber production. This is made possible 
through the presence of the mining company and its effort to honour its social obligations 
to affected communities. 
 
 Core business and objectives  
A key driver for rubber development in the Western Province has been the success story of 
CASE 2, which has operated a natural rubber-processing factory for the last 23 years. Image 
7 shows the setup of CASE 2’s rubber processing plant. CASE 2 began as a joint venture 
between a rubber trading company and a mining company development trust in 1993. Over 
time, CASE 2 transformed to a hybrid cooperative structure, however, it still maintains its 
status as a limited liability company. Its shareholding from small farmers has increased from 
1% of total shareholdings in 1994 to 79% in 2016, so it has been able provide a source of 
income for its rubber farmers. Its 2015 annual report states it has paid out US$ 14 million 
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directly to its farmers since 1994 for raw rubber production and an additional US$ 2 million 
remains as assets belonging to the shareholder farmers.   
 
 
Image 7. Interior setup of CASE 2’s processing plant, on the left is the extruder, centre is 
the drier unit and on the right is the compressor 
 
Prior to the establishment of CASE 2, a rubber trading company was in operation since the 
introduction of rubber in the province in the 1960’s. This company is a subsidiary of a retail 
and hardware company established in the 1960’s. This company is co-owned by the people 
of Western Province. 2I confirms that this company has been an important strategic partner 
in CASE 2, providing strategic directions, expertise in rubber trading, necessary transport 
requirements, business administration and management. The rubber trading company owns 
a fleet of three river vessels (50-140 tonne capacity). These vessels are hired by CASE 2 for 
rubber collection and buying along the river.  
 
Since the drop of the rubber price in 1980, trading of raw rubber had become an 
uneconomical exercise. As 2A recalls processing companies were buying unprocessed 
rubber at less than US$ 0.33 per kilogram for dry weight.   The cost of freight to ship the 
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unprocessed rubber to the nearest processing plant was also high as US$ 0.33 per kilogram.  
The high moisture level in unprocessed rubber meant increased freight cost and a decrease 
in profit margins. 
 
2A shared his experience of establishing one of the first rubber trading company: 
 
“I encouraged rubber planting in 1967 and having put the people to hard work. I was always 
looking for ways so they could always sell their rubber. That is why we formed the rubber 
trading company in the first instance, to buy rubber and ship it out to the nearest processing 
plant. Then when we could not a good price from the processor, we stockpiled the rubber so 
we could start our own processing plant. Processing has always been the intention because 
raw rubber always has at least 40% water in it and to ship 40% water to Port Moresby or 
anywhere is really a waste, a big waste. So, the idea is to process the rubber until we are 
shipping pure dry rubber and only paying freight on pure dry rubber.” 
 
As pointed out by 2A the cost of transporting water contained in the raw rubber was 
uneconomical considering the low price of rubber. Given this circumstance, CASE 2 was 
established with the aim to increase returns on raw rubber to sustain the livelihoods of 
farmers who depend on this rubber. Image 8 shows the farming families along the river who 
depend on rubber as a main source of livelihood. As stated in CASE 2’s 1996 annual review 
report, its primary objective was to produce a consistently, high quality processed rubber 
that is competitive on the world market. It has been able to achieve this through the 
construction of a factory funded by the rubber trading company, the trustee of the mining 
company and loan capital. CASE 2’s 2015 annual report states it has exported 16,618 ton of 
technical specified rubber worth US$ 24.1 million since establishment. A subsequent 
objective was to secure rubber growers’ interests. It intends to achieve this by sustaining a 
price no less than US$ 0.13 per kilogram. 2A and 2B point out that unlike other crops in PNG 
that have stabilisation funds established by the government, rubber has never had a 
stabilisation fund as the industry’s return is not sufficient to sustain a stabilisation fund 
scheme. CASE 2 was able to retain a surplus from trading to establish its own stabilisation 
funds. 
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Image 8.  Farming families along the river of Western Province gathered to sell their raw 
rubber to officers of CASE 2 
 
 A strategy to ensure the sustainability of its operation was to invest in new rubber planting 
development. This is reaffirmed by its objective to improve production techniques with the 
assistance of the Department of Primary Industry and to support industry development with 
the assistance of the trustee of the mining company. The Company has invested US$ 0.83 
million, which constitutes 8.6% of a total of US$ 9.6 million put into new planting of rubber 
by development partners.  
 
 Business strategy and value adding  
CASE 2 sells TSR denoted as PNGCR10 (PNG Classified Rubber grade 10). This is a rubber 
product made to the specification of buyers overseas for making tyres and seaport fenders. 
PNGCR10 is the highest quality rubber derived from naturally coagulated rubber. The 
parameters for determining the grade is the maximum level of moisture, dirt, volatile 
matter, nitrogen and sulphur permitted in the rubber. In addition to this, the plasticity of 
the rubber, before and after, heating is measured. The levels of these parameters for 
PNGCR10 are higher compared to the standards from Malaysia and Indonesia. The lowest 
grade of rubber is “TSR 50”, which is made from ground spills and recycled rubber. The 
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Company does not have its own laboratory to test its rubber but sends samples of its rubber 
elsewhere in PNG to be tested.  
 
In order to acquire sufficient supply of raw rubber to process, CASE 2 uses its own vehicles 
to buy rubber from its farmers along the roads and river. For farmers along the river, it uses 
river ferries owned by the rubber buying company to do this. CASE 2 pays freight to the 
rubber trading company at a subsided rate. CASE 2 purchases rubber at a lower rate for 
farmer located in remote areas along the river. This is to accommodate for freight costs.  
Respondent 2F, whose farm was along the river reported he received US$ 0.06 less for every 
kilogram compared to members closer to the processing plant. 
 
Once the rubber arrives at the processing plant it is processed as described in Section 4.4.1 
in the product flow of rubber. For quality purposes, samples have to be sent to a certified 
laboratory to ensure the parameters stated earlier have been met. If the standards have 
been attained the rubber is wrapped and packed into palletised bales ready for export. 
Image 9 shows the final product of CASE 2, palletised bales of rubber, labelled with 
importer’s address and ready to be shipped out. The processed rubber is shipped out of the 
province through arrangements made with the mining company to backload empty 
containers returning to the main port in the capital city.  
 
The processed rubber is exported to Australia, Germany and China. The product is sold to 
processors specialised in manufacturing dock fenders, mountings and tyres. There have 
been occasions when the processed rubber was sold through an agent particularly when 
quantity requirements were not met. 
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 Image 9. Packed dry rubber ready for export in CASE 2’s warehouse 
 
 Institutional and governance arrangements 
CASE 2 has two classes of shares, external investor shares and ordinary shares. The 
Company’s strategic partner owns its external investor shares. Initially, the Company had 
two strategic partners but one of the partners exited in 2015, gifting its shares back to the 
Company. The external investor shares are redeemable, transferable and appreciable. Each 
of these shares confers a voting right and a fixed annual dividend equal to 12% of its initial 
book value on its owner. Unlike ordinary shares, the external investor shares are 
redeemable and the Company will redeem them at their audited book value when the 
investor exits. Equity capital contributed by the external investors financed the Company’s 
establishment and its processing plant. 
 
The Company’s ordinary shares are owned by the small farmers who supply it with rubber. 
These shares are non-redeemable, transferable, and appreciable. The Company’s 
constitution provides for a share-trading platform administered by the Company’s directors 
on behalf of its ordinary shareholders. The directors will offer a seller’s shares to ordinary 
shareholders at a price agreed with the seller, or at a price set by an external auditor if the 
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seller and directors do not agree on a price. If there are no willing buyers amongst the 
shareholders, the directors will offer them to other farmers in the Western Province who 
can supply the Company with rubber. However, farmers are not required to buy shares in 
proportion to their patronage. Like the Company’s external investor shares, each ordinary 
share confers a voting right and a fixed annual dividend equal to 12% of its original book 
value on its owner. Dividends are payable when the Company has a cash surplus. 
 
Shares were issued at a price of US$ 0.33 per share in 1993. The book value of shares had 
grown to US$ 2.04 in 2015, with an aggregate value of US$ 1.2 million. The strategic partner 
owns 100,007 external investor shares, and small farmers own 376,950 ordinary shares. 
Respondents 2A and 2B expected the uptake of ordinary shares to increase as more 
cultivated rubber came into production. The Company was still offering ordinary shares (not 
yet taken up) at a price of US$ 0.33 per share to encourage more farmers to supply raw 
rubber to its processing plant. 
 
In 2014, the Company bought back 40,713 shares from 293 ordinary shareholders at a price 
of US$ 3.02 per share. The Company’s auditor set this price. According to respondent 2B, 
the rationale for this exercise was to ensure that ordinary shareholders had equal voting 
rights. Following this once-off buy-back, none of the farmer (patron) shareholders owned 
more than 100 ordinary shares. At the time of the study in 2016, the farmers collectively 
held 79% of the Company’s total shareholding, and the external investor held 21%. Although 
the farmers collectively possess a majority of the voting power, the constitution allows the 
strategic partner to appoint five of the board’s ten directors, including the chairperson who 
has a casting vote. This effectively gives the strategic partner, a minority shareholder, 
control of the Company.  
 
This apparent imbalance in control could be criticised as unfair and the source of a serious 
influence problem. However, when viewed in the context of a temporary partnership where 
the intention is to pass ownership and control to empowered farmers, the influence 
‘problem’ is precisely what makes the Company creditworthy while the strategic partner 
trains and mentors the farmers and their elected directors in the application of good 
governance and management practices.  
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Training of small farmers has been an on-going process to ensure they are acquainted with 
their roles and responsibilities in the Company.  2C, 2D and 2E confirmed that they received 
specialised training facilitated by the mining company for local business owners operating 
within the vicinity of the mine. This provides an indication of the on-the-job training and 
mentoring provided by the strategic partner. 
 
Three of the five directors representing farmer’s interest were nominated and elected by 
ordinary shareholders at annual general meetings. 2G and 2H indicated that the remaining 
two directors were nominated and elected by ordinary shareholders at meetings called in 
their own production zones. The Company’s constitution provides for polls by secret ballot 
but the elections were conducted by a show of hands, plus proxy votes submitted on forms 
delivered to shareholders in more remote areas. In respondent 2G’s words: 
 
“I am an ‘ordinary’ class shareholders and only ‘ordinary’ class shareholders can 
nominate and elect small farmers as directors… external investor shareholders 
are different.”  
 
A democratic voting process is consistent with proportional voting rights when shareholders 
own similar numbers of shares, but voting by a show of hands tends to skew results in 
favour of influential candidates. Ordinary shareholders did not participate in board or 
management decisions but they did vote on resolutions with significant financial or 
constitutional implications, as required by the Company’s constitution.  
 
At the time of the study, CASE 2 had five farmer directors, and four directors representing 
the interest of the strategic partner including the chairperson. The strategic partner’s 
representatives were formally qualified and experienced directors. The chairperson is a 
prominent business personality in PNG, and managing director of a group of companies 
involved in transportation, auto-repairs and accommodation services. The strategic 
partner’s representatives also held senior positions in this group of companies, several of 
which had been operating successfully since 1969. The outgoing general manager, an 
expatriate from Malaysia with over 30 years’ experience in rubber processing technology, 
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had recently been replaced by a qualified accountant and experienced manager, also from 
Malaysia.  Two of the farmers’ representatives had served as directors on CASE 2’s board for 
more than ten years. One of these directors was a former teacher, and the other held a 
tertiary qualification. The others farmer directors are respected leaders in their 
communities. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned directors, the board also has two associate directors - 
one representing the interests of provincial government agencies, and the other the 
interests of a major shareholder in the mining company that helped to establish CASE 2. The 
provincial government has been a long-time sponsor of smallholder rubber development 
and rehabilitation projects. CASE 2 implements and manages some of these projects. 
Associate directors participate fully in board meetings but do not have voting rights.   
 
In summary, CASE 2 is a company that operates like an investor-share cooperative. The 
strategic partner owns redeemable shares while patron members own non-redeemable 
shares. Both classes of shares are appreciable and therefore allow shareholders to realise 
capital gains. The strategic partner redeems shares at their audited value, while patron-
members receive the market price for shares traded on platform managed by the board. 
However, investments are not proportional to patronage, and there are no tradeable 
delivery rights. The strategic partner retained a voting majority on the board even though 
patron members had become majority investors. This imbalance was intended to be a 
temporary arrangement while the strategic partner embedded good governance practices 
and mentored inexperienced directors. Directors take strategic decisions and managers are 
responsible for operational decisions. Ordinary shareholders participate in decisions only 
when these decisions have significant financial or constitutional implications. 
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Chapter 5  
Results and discussion 
 
 Introduction  
This chapter draws on the case descriptions in Chapter 4 to test propositions listed in 
Chapter 3. These propositions relate a cooperative’s value-adding performance to its 
institutional and governance arrangements. Section 5.2 summarises the value-adding 
activities observed in each case, and Section 5.3 presents a pattern matching analysis of 
their institutional and governance arrangements. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the findings in relation to cooperative development in PNG, and discusses other factors that 
may have affected the performance of the organisations studied.  
 
 Observed value adding performance for CASE 1 and CASE 2  
CASE 1’s intended objective was to access niche markets for dry cocoa beans. It had not 
achieved this objective. Despite being gifted fermentaries, a drier and a truck, the 
Cooperative was unable to transport and process cocoa beans at low cost and did not 
secure a premium price from domestic buyers, nor did it obtain export status. As a result, 
the Cooperative did not offer patrons competitive prices for their cocoa and failed to attract 
even the modest volumes required to operate their plant at capacity. The Cooperative sold 
a meagre 238 ton of cocoa between 2014 and 2016. This represented less than 1% of their 
buyer’s total export volume. Management decided to supplement patron deliveries by 
producing its own cocoa and pledged the Cooperative’s truck as collateral for a loan to 
purchase 10 hectares of land. The lender repossessed the truck when the Cooperative 
defaulted on its loan. The Cooperative established cocoa trees on its land and the yield from 
these trees will fully utilise the capacity of its fermentaries and drier. Without additional 
processing capacity, the Cooperative will not be in a position to purchase wet beans from 
patrons, and patrons are therefore unlikely to benefit from value-adding unless more capital 
can be raised to extend its processing plant. The analysis of the Cooperative’s institutional 
arrangements in Section 5.3 sheds light on its ability to raise equity and debt capital.  
CASE 2, on the other hand, did achieve its objective of processing raw rubber into technical 
specified rubber, and had sustained its operation for 24 years. This required significant 
 
  
59 
  
capital, which was raised by establishing a creditworthy company with two strategic equity 
partners. The Company’s value-adding performance was exceptional. The Company’s 
nominal net worth grew at an average rate of 1.1% per annum (adjusted for inflation) 
between 2010 and 2015. The audited value of its shares grew from PGK 2.29 per share in 
1993 to PGK 6.50 in 2015 when measured in constant (2015) prices (representing a real 
growth of PGK4.21) with patrons accounting for 79% of the shareholding. Since its 
establishment, CASE 2 had purchased 30,000 tons of raw rubber from smallholders, and 
exported 17,000 tons of processed rubber. Patron’s earned US$13.6 million from rubber 
sales and received a dividend of 12% per annum paid on the initial value of the shares every 
five years. 
 
  Observed institutional and governance arrangements  
Table 2 presents key institutional attributes identified by the NIE (Chapter 2) as factors likely 
to influence the value-adding performance of producer organisations. These theoretical 
relationships were specified as a testable proposition in Section 3.2. Table 2 expresses the 
attributes as solutions to institutional problems associated with traditional cooperatives and 
codes them with a tick () to indicate the presence of an investor-friendly attribute, or a 
cross (X) otherwise.  
 
CASE 1 and CASE 2 differ markedly in respect of their institutional attributes. CASE 1 
adopted the investor-unfriendly features of a traditional cooperative. Investors cannot 
realise capital gains, nor can they prevent non-investors from capturing the benefits of their 
investment. They do not benefit from greater control over cooperative decisions, nor can 
they disinvest when directors and managers make poor decisions. Not surprising, fewer 
than 3% of the shareholders had paid for their shares, and donors financed all of the 
Cooperative’s assets. Apart from discouraging investment, CASE 1’s institutional attributes 
also encouraged side selling. Incentives to comply with contracts diminish when the benefits 
of compliance cannot be realised through future capital gains, and the cost of negotiating 
supply contracts increases when investment is not proportional to patronage. The 
Cooperative did not link patronage to appreciable shares and persistent side selling 
prevented the Cooperative from building the volumes it needed to offer patrons 
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competitive prices. It is understandable that management did not specify supply contracts 
as enforcement costs increase when members have little incentive to comply with their 
terms.  
 
Table 2. Comparison of institutional arrangements observed in CASE 1 (poor value-adding 
performance) and CASE 2 (good value-adding performance)  
 
In contrast, CASE 2 has several investor-friendly attributes. These attributes enabled the 
Company to attract capital from strategic partners and farmers. Initially, the equity capital, 
expertise and markets introduced by two strategic partners lent credibility to the Company 
enabling it to finance a processing plant from both equity and debt capital. One of the 
strategic partners invested largely to safeguard its mining interests in the province, the 
other to secure supplies for its rubber trading business. In essence, the mining company 
provided grant capital as it later withdrew from CASE 2 leaving its capital in the business. 
The rubber trading company, on the other hand, had a long-term interest in the success of 
the joint venture to secure high quality rubber for its foreign buyers. For rubber producers, 
Institutional attributes 
Institutional 
problems alleviated 
Traditional 
cooperative 
CASE 1 CASE 2 
Capital gains realised by 
revaluation of the share price or by 
issuing bonus shares 
Horizon problem X X  
Producer organisation issues a class 
of non-redeemable shares 
Redemption risk X X  
Capital gains realised by trading 
shares at market price 
Horizon, portfolio & 
control problems 
X X  
Investment proportional to 
patronage 
Internal free-rider 
problem & high 
transaction costs 
X X X 
Non-member patrons do not 
benefit from favourable prices 
offered to members 
External free-rider 
problem 
 X  
Producer organisation issues 
tradable delivery rights 
All the above 
problems 
X X X 
Voting rights are proportional to 
investment 
Influence problem X X  
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the rubber trading company represented a strategic partner with common interests and 
complementary resources.  
 
It is not clear what each of the initial strategic partners contributed to the design of CASE 2’s 
institutional arrangements but several unique features emerged in this process. 
Importantly, shares issued to farmers and strategic partners differed in that farmers’ shares 
were non-redeemable and tradeable, whereas those held by the strategic partners were 
redeemable. At first glance, this arrangement appears to favour strategic partners as it gives 
them a ‘buyer of last resort’ option, and a price at least equal to the current audited value of 
the Company’s shares. Farmers, on the other hand, confront the vagaries of an illiquid 
market for their shares in a company exposed to redemption risk. However, it is important 
to temper this negative view with what the Company achieved in terms of adding value and 
sharing benefits with farmers. The rubber trading company may not have invested in the 
joint venture without a predictable exit mechanism. Redeeming shares at their current book 
value amplifies redemption risk, but also encourages strategic partners to grow the value of 
the Company before they exit, and gives farmers control over the entry of new partners.  
 
The data presented in Table 2 support propositions (a) and (b) in Section 5 that producer 
organisations are more likely to sustain value-adding activities if they adopt market or non-
market mechanisms that permit investors to realise capital gains. The data also support the 
NIE view that performance improves when institutional arrangements eliminate external 
free riders, but are not entirely consistent with proposition (c) in Section 3.2 that producer 
organisations are more likely to sustain relationships with downstream buyers if patrons are 
obliged to buy tradable shares or delivery rights in proportion to their patronage.  
 
Proportionality between patronage and investment helps to align the interests of patrons 
and investors and encourages patrons to meet their commitments to supply the 
organisation. The incentive to comply is stronger still when patrons can realise the future 
benefits of long-term supply relationships established with downstream buyers through 
capital gains. While the absence of these institutional arrangement helps to explain 
pervasive side-selling in CASE 1, there was no evidence of this problem in CASE 2 even 
though it, too, did not require patrons to invest in proportion to their patronage. A likely 
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explanation for this anomaly is that CASE 2 did not face competition from other, local 
rubber buyers. The Company’s decision to equalise patron shareholding through its buy-
back scheme would also have helped to improve proportionality between patronage and 
investment as the patrons owned most (71%) of the Company’s shares and (as smallholders) 
had similar levels of production.  
 
Lastly, the data presented in Table 2 appear to support the NIE argument that a lack of 
proportionality between investment and voting rights can lead to influence problems that 
discourage investment and lending. However, it is unlikely that proportional voting rights in 
CASE 2 had much to do with its relative success as the impact of voting rights was diluted by 
governance arrangements in both cases. Table 3 summarises key governance attributes 
associated with the value-adding performance of producer organisations. These 
relationships (discussed in Section 3.4) were reduced to a testable proposition in Section 
3.2. As in Table 2, ticks () indicate the presence of ‘good’ governance attributes observed 
in each case, while crosses indicate their absence. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of governance arrangements observed in CASE 1 (poor value-adding 
performance) and CASE 2 (good value-adding performance) 
Governance attributes CASE 1 CASE 2 
Shareholders nominate elected directors   
Elected directors outnumber any other directors   
Elections are conducted by secret ballot X X 
Board has the authority to hire and fire executive managers X  
Members do not participate directly in decision-making   
Organisation specialises in a single product   
Producer organisation has qualified directors  X  
Presence of qualified and experienced manager(s) X1  
 Note: 1. CASE 1 did not have a manager at the time of the study. 
 
The evidence presented in Table 3 shows that CASE 2 had a predominance of good 
governance arrangements compared to CASE 1. A weakness common to both cases is the 
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election of directors by show of hands rather than by secret ballot. This process can 
introduce influence problems, as smallholders may feel obliged to nominate and vote for 
local authorities whose interests do not align with those of the shareholders. CASE 1 
suffered additional weaknesses. Firstly, it could not afford to hire a manager and the board’s 
chair had assumed the management role. This compromised the ability of the board to 
sanction or fire the manager for poor performance. This governance problem may well have 
contributed to the Cooperative’s financial difficulties. Secondly, it lacked qualified and 
experienced directors. In both cases decision-making was entrusted to a centralised 
decision-making body (i.e. members did not participate directly in decision-making). 
However, CASE 1 did not have a manager and lacked competent directors. CASE 2, on the 
other hand, benefitted from knowledgeable and experienced directors and managers 
introduced by its strategic partner.  
 
The data in Table 3 mask a recent influence problem in CASE 2 that could undermine its 
good performance in the long-term. The Company issued ordinary shares to its small 
farmers, and redeemable shares to its strategic partner. Each of these parties nominates 
and elects its own directors to the Company’s board. Initially, smallholders were entitled to 
elect three directors, whereas the strategic partner was entitled to elect five directors. 
These arrangements afforded smallholders greater representation and exposure to 
decision-making than their investment warranted, but ensured that control remained with 
the majority investor. When smallholders overtook the strategic partner as the majority 
investor, it was agreed that both parties could elect five directors to the board. However, 
the board’s chair was reserved for a director nominated by the strategic partner, and the 
chairperson was given a casting vote that effectively kept control in the hands of the 
strategic partner. This imbalance may have a short-term advantage in maintaining the 
Company’s creditworthiness while farmer-elected directors are still ‘in training’, but other 
governance arrangements could afford much the same protection without exposing the 
Company to political criticism and a potentially damaging influence problem. For example, 
smallholders could nominate and elect credible outsiders as additional directors or associate 
directors with voting rights on the board. 
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 Discussion 
The conceptual model in Section 3.2 postulates that producer organisations with investor-
friendly institutional and governance arrangements are more likely to achieve their value-
adding objectives than are those that adopt the institutional arrangements of a traditional 
cooperative. The findings of this study support this premise. The successful rubber company 
issued shares that were tradable and appreciable, and provided a trading platform for 
shares owned by farmers. The shares also conferred voting rights. These institutional 
arrangements allocate capital gains and control of the organisation to investors in direct 
proportion to their investment. The less successful cocoa cooperative did not adopt these 
investor-friendly institutional arrangements. 
 
This result is consistent with findings reported by Rosairo, et al. (2012) in their study of 
farmer-owned marketing companies in Sri Lanka where companies that allocated capital 
gains to shareholders by issuing bonus shares or tradable shares outperformed those that 
did not adopt such mechanisms to solve the horizon problem. None of the farmer-owned 
companies studied by Rosairo et al. (2012) adopted investment proportional voting rights.  
The rubber company did however, have two potential weaknesses in its institutional 
arrangements. First, it did not link farmer investment to patronage. This creates a potential 
free-rider problem and weakens farmer incentives to comply with their supply contracts. 
The Company alleviated potential free-rider problems by buying back farmer’s shares to 
create a more equal distribution of shares that better matched their deliveries. However, 
future trading of shares could alter relative shareholdings, resulting in a misalignment of 
farmer interests as patrons and investors with adverse consequences for investment and 
contract compliance.  The cocoa Cooperative shared this weakness (as did all of the farmer-
owned companies studied by Rosairo, et al. (2012)) and succumbed to flagrant side selling. 
This problem did not emerge in the rubber company, possibly because it had addressed the 
horizon problem, but more likely because it was the only local rubber buyer. Again, this is a 
situation that may change in the future and the rubber company ought to consider issuing 
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tradable delivery rights tied or ‘stapled’ to their shareholding as they are in some 
(successful) Australian irrigation cooperatives (Plunkett, Chaddad, & Cook, 2010).  
 
Second, the rubber company created governance arrangements relating to board 
representation that allowed a strategic partner to retain control of the Company when it 
was no longer the majority investor. While there may be good reasons to ‘create’ an 
influence problem to preserve the Company’s creditworthiness, this argument becomes less 
convincing over time as farmer-elected directors gain management knowledge and 
experience. Besides, there are alternative ways of protecting the board’s credibility that do 
not disempower smallholders when they become majority investors, and the rubber 
company ought to consider governance options that allow farmers to nominate and elect 
external experts to complement directors elected from within their own ranks. In the cocoa 
Cooperative, voting rights were democratic and not proportional to investment. This 
embeds a potential influence problem, especially when directors are elected by a show of 
hands. Rosairo, et al. (2012) observed the same democratic voting rights in all of their Sri 
Lankan cases, but found little evidence of influence problems when decision-making was 
centralised in the hands of accountable directors and managers. Esnard (2016: 75-76) made 
the same observation in his study of four producer-owned marketing cooperatives in the 
Caribbean region, and Plunkett et al. (2010) stress the advantage of centralised decision-
making in their analysis of two successful irrigation cooperatives in Australia. The cocoa 
cooperative did separate control from ownership, and may therefore be less susceptible to 
influence problems than its voting rights and procedures suggest.  
 
A cursory analysis of the cocoa Cooperative’s lacklustre performance points to problems of 
inadequate capital, side-selling, and poor management decisions. The failure of PNG’s first 
cooperative movement in the 1970’s was attributed largely to these same issues 
(Mugambwa, 2005). However, this deeper analysis of the Cooperative identified underlying 
institutional flaws that induce low investment and side selling. While potential influence 
problems were mitigated by separating ownership from control, the benefits of centralised 
decision-making were diluted by a lack of high quality directors and managers. Whereas the 
rubber company was controlled by competent directors and managers, the cocoa 
Cooperative was controlled by poorly educated farmer directors and managers who had no 
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previous experience in business management. Given the realities of PNG’s smallholder 
farming sector, this outcome is almost inevitable when cooperatives are obliged to adopt a 
structure that not only discourages investment, but which also prevents strategic partners 
from becoming majority or even significant shareholders in a cooperative. Section 60 of 
PNG’s Cooperative Societies Act (1982) prevents any member from holding more than 20% 
of a cooperative’s shares, and the proposed cooperative policy defines membership only in 
terms of natural persons (CSU, 2008, Section 4.2.4). Lyne and Collins (2008) note that 
several developed countries have relaxed their cooperative law to allow investment from 
non-patrons, and that this has resulted in the emergence of hybrid cooperatives that 
resemble investor-owned firms, but with restrictions on voting power that prevent outright 
control passing to non-patrons. 
 
Of concern is that PNG’s proposed cooperative policy, not only prohibits transactions in 
member shares (CSU, 2008, Section 4.2.8), but also promotes governance arrangements 
allowing cooperatives to adopt customary (wantok) practices familiar to, and respected by, 
local communities. Such arrangements could seriously undermine the performance of 
marketing cooperatives that have value-adding objectives. It is unlikely that shareholders 
will supply capital and products to cooperatives if they cannot hold directors accountable 
through their voting power, and if directors cannot hold managers accountable by firing 
them. Odhuno (2017, p. 5) bluntly criticises PNG’s draft Integrated Rural Development Policy 
as it does not “acknowledge that attempts to run co-operatives the ‘PNG way’ is the reason 
the country’s co-operatives sector is not well developed”. 
 
The cases investigated in this research were purposefully selected to differ in respect of 
their institutional arrangements while controlling for other determinants of value-adding 
performance. In particular, both organisations processed a single agricultural commodity 
sold in export markets, and both were supplied only by small-scale farmers. Nevertheless, 
other factors did contribute to differences in their performance. First, the rubber company 
was less vulnerable to side selling than the cocoa Cooperative as it was the only local buyer. 
That said, the cocoa cooperative did nothing to address the horizon problem that made it 
prone to side selling. Both organisations could benefit from issuing tradable delivery rights 
to promote contract compliance. Second, differences in product characteristics also counted 
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in the rubber company’s favour. Rubber is less perishable and subject to less stringent 
quality standards than food crops like cocoa. Raw rubber can be stockpiled for a year 
without significant quality losses (Brown, 2001), providing flexibility in the timing of post-
harvest processing. Third, while both producer organisations benefited from external 
support, the source and nature of this support differed. The cocoa Cooperative received 
donor funding through projects planned by the Cocoa Board, a statutory organisation, and 
its buying and quality control activities are subsidised by an exporter. Neither of these 
parties has a financial interest in the Cooperative, nor do they share in its risk. They have no 
decision-making authority within the Cooperative and no more than an altruistic motive to 
mentor its directors and managers. This contrasts sharply with the rubber company, which 
benefitted from equity capital injected by a strategic partner that needed to secure its 
supply of raw rubber. In this case, the partner shares in the Company’s decision-making and 
its fortunes, and therefore has a strong incentive to improve the efficiency of its smallholder 
patrons and to mentor their directors.  
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion and recommendations 
 
 Introduction   
The aim of this research was to inform cooperative policy and legislation in PNG. Its 
objective was to examine the institutional and governance arrangements of producer 
organisations in PNG, and to analyse the impact of these arrangements on the achievement 
of intended business strategies. This chapter draws on the research questions posed in 
Chapter 2 to highlight key findings and to make recommendations for policy and legislation. 
The chapter concludes with the study’s contribution to the literature, its limitations and 
recommendations for future research. 
 
 Key findings  
The key findings are presented with reference to the (five) research questions posed in 
Chapter 2, namely: 
1. Do producer organisations apply different institutional and governance 
arrangements to support business strategies that require different levels of value-
adding?   
2. Are the institutional and governance arrangements applied by producer 
organisations affecting the achievement of their intended business strategies?  
3. How consistent are these institutional and governance arrangements with PNG’s 
existing cooperative law? 
4. Would changes to PNG’s cooperative policy and legislation make it easier for 
cooperatives to achieve their intended business strategies?  
5. What other factors contribute to the achievement of intended business strategies? 
 
Case studies were made of two producer organisations that displayed contrasting levels of 
success in achieving their value-adding goals. Descriptive and comparative analyses of these 
cases provided a definite ‘yes’ in answer to research questions 1 and 2. Despite clear 
differences in their performance, the organisations were essentially following similar 
business strategies. Both focused on early-stage, post-harvest processing services to access 
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international commodity markets as low cost producers. There was no attempt to 
differentiate the product or to exploit premium prices in niche markets. Nevertheless, stark 
differences in their performance were consistent with theoretical propositions about 
relationships between a producer organisation’s ability to add value and its institutional and 
governance arrangements. In particular, the low performing organisation operated as a 
traditional cooperative with redeemable, non-tradable and non-appreciable shares that 
prevented its patron members from realising future capital gains. This not only discouraged 
investment, but also encouraged members to take advantage of short-term opportunities 
by side-selling to other buyers who offered higher prices. In contrast, the high performer 
issued shares that were appreciable, and operated a trading platform for its non-
redeemable shares. In addition, this organisation linked voting power to shareholding, 
whereas the poor performer exposed its investors to an influence problem by allocating 
equal voting power to all members regardless of their level of investment. The high 
performer also exposed its patron members to an influence problem by assigning majority 
voting power to directors representing its minority investor, and both organisations elected 
their directors by show of hands – another potential source of influence problems. These 
threats were mitigated in both organisation by clear separation of ownership and control. 
Unfortunately, the low performer could not take full advantage of centralised decision-
making as it lacked competent directors and managers. Moreover, the directors could not 
hold the manager accountable for bad decisions as the chairperson also served as the 
organisation’s voluntary manager to ease its financial stress. 
 
With regard to research question 3, the low performer’s conservative institutional 
arrangements were entirely consistent with PNG’s existing cooperative law and its proposed 
cooperative policy, both of which prohibit the adoption of models that reward investors 
with capital gains (Cooperative Societies Act, 1982, Section 62; CSU, 2008, Section 4.2.8) and 
extra voting power (Cooperative Societies Act, 1982, Section 77). Its governance 
arrangements were also consistent with the legislation, which limits membership to natural 
persons, and directorship to members only (Cooperative Societies Act 1982 Section 67).  
Additionally, the low performer opted for equal shareholding, which follows the spirit of 
existing law (Section 60 of the Act prevents any member from owning more than 20% of a 
cooperative’s total shareholding) and proposed cooperative policy (CSU,2008, Section 
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4.2.4). The high performer, on the other hand, adopted institutional arrangements that 
were not consistent with current cooperative legislation or proposed cooperative policy. 
This organisation issued non-redeemable, tradable and appreciable shares, assigned voting 
power in proportion to shareholding, did not restrict membership to natural persons, and 
permitted members to hold more than 20% of total shareholding. These institutional 
arrangements facilitated the equity-sharing partnerships that underpinned the high 
performer’s success, but which also required it to register as a company rather than a 
cooperative. The answer to research question 4 is therefore a resounding ‘yes’ - changes to 
PNG’s cooperative policy and legislation would certainly make it easier for cooperatives to 
achieve their intended business strategies.  
 
The answer to research question 5 is that other factors did influence performance of the 
case studies. First, the low performer was more vulnerable to side selling owing to the 
presence of other local buyers. Second, product characteristics gave the high performer an 
advantage by providing flexibility in the timing of post-harvest processing. Third, the level of 
involvement of agencies that facilitated and financed the producer organisations differed. 
The high performer’s business partners had a financial interest in the organisation and 
shared in its risk. 
 
 Recommendations  
The recommendations offered in this section target PNG’s policy makers, government and 
donor agencies involved in promoting cooperative development, and the directors and 
managers of cooperatives.   
 
Producer organisations are more likely to attract strategic partners and benefit from their 
financial, human and intangible assets if horizon problems are fully addressed. This means 
investors should be able to realise market-related capital gains. PNG’s cooperatives should 
therefore be allowed to issue non-redeemable, appreciable and tradable class B shares to 
patron and non-patron (i.e. external) investors. Membership should not be limited to 
natural persons, and there should be no ceiling on the number or proportion of class B 
shares purchased by any approved member. However, these shares should carry limited 
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voting rights. In New Zealand, external investors can nominate a maximum of 40% of the 
elected directors. In PNG, this might be extended to 50% to encourage equity partnerships 
with firms that agree to adhere to a code of ethical conduct. Such a code might permit 
patron directors to appoint a non-voting mentor to assist them at board meetings, and 
require strategic partners to provide certified valuations of tangible and intangible assets 
offered as equity capital. It is also recommended that restrictions preventing patron 
members from nominating and electing competent outsiders as their directors should be 
scrapped. 
 
Cooperatives should also be allowed to decide whether voting rights assigned to patron 
members are democratic or proportional to investment. Governance arrangements that do 
not assign democratic or investment proportional voting rights, do not embed sound 
electoral procedures, or – most importantly – do not centralise decision making in the hands 
of accountable directors and managers should not be promoted in policy or provided for in 
legislation.  
 
Cooperative efforts to build supply relationships with premium buyers adversely affected 
when members side sell to competitors. Members are more likely to honour supply 
contracts with cooperatives when their incentives as investors and patrons are well-aligned, 
and they can realise future benefits from compliance. Legalising class B shares would allow 
cooperatives to offer these shares to patrons as tradable delivery rights. If cooperatives 
raise equity capital by selling delivery rights rather than membership shares, they would not 
only encourage patron investment and discourage side selling, but would also reduce their 
exposure to redemption risk. On the other hand, if cooperatives issue rather than sell these 
delivery rights to producers, they should allocate the rights in proportion to producer 
investment in membership shares. That is, the delivery rights should remain tied or ‘stapled’ 
to shareholding so that producers cannot sell (buy) these rights without redeeming 
(purchasing more) membership shares. If cooperatives transact with producers who are not 
shareholders, they should discount prices paid for their produce, and charge a premium for 
for services rendered. 
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Donor and government agencies should extend the financial and logistical support currently 
provided to cooperatives to other types of producer organisation, like producer-owned 
companies and unitised trusts. This would create more opportunities for smallholders to 
leverage financial and human capital from strategic partners and commercial lenders.  
 
 The study’s contribution, limitations, and future research 
This study contributed evidence-based recommendations for policy and legislation in PNG 
that provide agricultural marketing cooperatives with greater flexibility in the structures 
they can adopt to support value adding strategies. Moreover, it contributes to the limited 
literature on cooperative performance, institutions and governance in PNG after the 
reintroduction of cooperatives in 2000.  
 
This study was limited to two producer organisations. Although these two organisations 
provided rich variation in performance and institutional arrangements, it would have been 
interesting to examine other cooperatives involved in value adding, especially those 
engaged in niche markets. Furthermore, this research used case study methodology and the 
results cannot be generalised to the population of cooperatives and producer companies.   
Future studies should consider larger samples and the possibility of quantitative analysis. A 
specific area of interest for future study is the impact of customary governance 
arrangements on the performance of cooperatives.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Research information sheet 
I would like to invite you to participate in my Lincoln University research project. I am a 
Masters of Commerce (Agribusiness) student researching existing and proposed institutional 
and governance arrangements for agricultural marketing cooperatives in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG).  
You have been chosen to participate because you are involved in an agricultural cooperative 
and so can provide useful insights into existing cooperatives in PNG. This research is 
important because it will help improve legislation and policy on cooperative societies in 
PNG.  
I would like to interview you on the 25th of November 2016. This interview will require 
about one hour of your time. You will be asked questions relating to the rules governing 
your cooperative and its implication on the business activities. Please be informed that 
questions relating to your financial dealings with the cooperative will asked. This 
information will remain confidential and your privacy will be maintained at all times.  
 To ensure that I can collect information accurately, I would like to audio record the 
interview. However, if you are uncomfortable with my recording the interview, please let 
me know and only notes will be taken.   
Your participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw your consent to 
participate at any time.  
Information from interviews will be used to write up my Master’s thesis and possibly used in 
a conference presentation and conference paper. However, your identity will remain 
anonymous, as you will be referred to in my notes, the recordings and the final thesis report 
as Participant One or similar. To protect your confidentiality, all recordings and notes taken 
during the interview will kept in a secure Lincoln University file and will only be accessed by 
me, my supervisors and Human Ethics Committee for audit purposes.  
If you have any queries or concerns about this research, please contact me or my 
supervisor:  
Researcher: Naomi Mwayawa, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce, Lincoln University, 
New Zealand. 
Email: Naomi. Mwayawa@lincolnuni.ac.nz 
 
My supervisor: Nic Lees, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce, Lincoln University, 
Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Email: Nic.Lees@lincoln.ac.nz 
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Appendix 2. Consent form 
I give my consent to participate in this research project. I have read and understood the details and 
the nature of the research project, and I agree to participate in the interview. This is with the 
understanding that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from this study at 
any time. 
I also understand that my privacy will be maintained and information that I provide will be stored 
securely at Lincoln University. 
Please indicate below whether or not you wish the interview to be audio recorded: 
I agree to have my interview audio recorded. 
I do not agree to have my interview recorded, but agree to notes taken. 
If you have any queries or concerns about this research, or want further information, please contact 
my supervisor or me:  
Researcher: Naomi Mwayawa, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce, Lincoln University, New 
Zealand. 
Email: Naomi. Mwayawa@lincolnuni.ac.nz 
 
My supervisor: Nic Lees, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce, Lincoln University, Christchurch, 
New Zealand. 
Email: Nic.Lees@lincoln.ac.nz 
Phone: 
 
Name:_______________________ 
Signature: _____________________     
Date: ____________ 
Position in the organisation :_________________________ 
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Appendix 3. Interview schedule 
Interviews with directors and managers 
1. Details of the producer organisation 
a. Date and nature of incorporation or registration 
b. Founding members 
c. History- successes and failures 
d. Size of shareholdings 
e. Number of shareholders 
f. Mission and vision statements 
g. Financial status/performance in the last three years 
h. Debt acquisition/repayments 
2. Business strategy  
a. Current operation of the organisation 
i. Products (multiple or single) /services provided 
ii. Processing 
iii. Financial capacity  
iv. Buyers and relationship with buyers 
v. Assets (acquisition  and maintenance), brand , patents 
b. Description of value adding activities  
c. Strategic gap- achievement of goals, mission and visions stated above 
d. Constraints to achieving these goals, missions and visions 
3. Institutional arrangements  
a. Active market for shares 
b. Nature of shares- non-redeemable, appreciable, tradable 
c. Classes of classed 
d. Dividends, bonus shares, rebates 
e. Revaluation of shares 
f. Benefit rights of shares offered to members and non-members (in the case of 
producer companies) 
g. Members’ willingness to provide equity capital 
h. Members’ preference for short term benefits 
i. Members’ willingness to reinvest 
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j. Organisation’s ability to retain profits  
k. Members’ loyalty  
l. Shareholding- patronage relationships 
m. Voting rights – voting and shareholding relationship  
4. Governance arrangements 
a. Duties, authority and composition of BoD 
b. Nomination of directors 
c. External representatives  
d. Off-farm skills and knowledge of directors  
e. Skills and experience of managers 
f. Participation of members in decision making  
g. Election procedures  
h. Procedures of meeting and conducting of annual general meetings 
i. Circulation of reports/notice/ minutes of meetings 
j. Audits 
k. Budget approval  
5. Other factors  
a. Government subsidies and support  
b. Donor agency support 
c. Industry performance 
d. Commodity prices 
e. Geographical location  
f. Strategic alliances  
Interview with members  
1. Details of membership 
a. History of membership  
b. Background on farming operations 
c. Size of shareholdings  
d. Particulars of patronage 
2. Strategy 
a. Current operation of the organisation 
i. Products (multiple or single) /services provided 
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ii. Processing 
iii. Financial capacity  
iv. Buyers and relationship with buyers 
v. Assets (acquisition  and maintenance), brand , patents 
a. Organisation’s goals, mission and vision 
b. Observations on the organisation’s ability to achieved its goals vision and 
mission 
 
3. Institutional Arrangements 
a. Nature of shares- non-redeemable, appreciable, tradable, classes 
b. Benefits received from the organisation 
i. Favourable prices 
ii. Capital gains 
iii. Bonus shares 
iv. Rebates  
v. Dividends 
b. Willingness to provide equity capital 
c. Limitations in investing  
d. Preference for short term benefits 
e. Willingness to reinvest 
f. Organisation’s ability to retain profits  
g.  Loyalty to organisation 
h. Shareholding- patronage relationships 
i. Voting rights – voting and shareholding relationship  
4. Governance Arrangements  
a. Member participation in decision making 
b. Election procedures  
c. Procedures of meeting and conducting of annual general meetings 
d. Circulation of reports/notice/ minutes of meetings 
e. Nomination of directors 
f. External representatives  
g.  
 
  
87 
  
5. Other factors  
g. Government subsidies and support  
h. Donor agency support 
i. Industry performance 
j. Commodity prices 
k. Geographical location  
l. Strategic alliances  
